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I.  INTRODUCTION1
 
The Laeken Declaration adopted by the European Council in December 2001 recognized, for 
the first time in European Union (EU) history, regions as potential co-architects of a new and 
more democratic EU. The Laeken Declaration also initiated the Convention to draft a new 
Constitution for Europe. The Constitution was negotiated during the Intergovernmental 
Conference and presented to the citizens of Europe in June 2004. On 29 October 2004, it was 
signed by heads of states and governments and sent to parliaments for ratifications and 
referenda. The Constitution provisions an expansion of the principle of subsidiarity affording 
greater influence to European citizens residing in self-administering and self-governing 
regions. Article III-270 of the Constitution will empower the Committee of the Regions 
(CoR) to petition the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on policy matters violating the 
principle of subsidiarity as laid out in the Constitution. This could become a substantial 
empowerment of European regions. Although most national minorities do not constitute 
designated European regions and the Constitution may not be ratified anytime in the near 
future, the envisaged empowerment of the CoR may nevertheless contribute to a redefinition 
of the national minority political space. With some of the new members and accession states 
representing ‘regions’ of strong national minority identities, the EU may be facing new 
challenges of integrating diversity. The influence of national minorities in the decision-
making processes may therefore assume relevance in the enlarged EU. 
 
There are a number of reasons why national minority identities pose new challenges to policy 
makers and politicians alike in relation to EU25 sub-state integration. Firstly, although self-
governing regions have gained inroads on the EU decision-making process in the EU15 era, 
they do not as yet have the clear co-governance mandate they have sought. While this deficit 
is destined to be reduced if the Constitution for Europe comes into effect, it will not as yet 
constitute co-governance. Secondly, national minorities without self-governing powers in the 
EU15 have begun to mobilize politically as states changed districting systems in recent efforts 
to democratize local politics. Some of these national minorities who draw on rediscovered 
identities linked to historical regions have benefited from cultural policies seeking 
preservation of European diversity. Thirdly, national minorities in the new member states 
have not been inept at copying their cousins in the West. In most of the new member states, 
national minorities are defined to a great extent by identities strongly attached to specific 
regions although not necessarily to recognized administrative regions. In other new member 
states, national minorities have been disempowered through recent redistricting legislation 
whose purpose it would seem is to weaken any strengthening of sub-state politics and 
nationalisms. As these national minorities often possess strong national minority identities 
and determination to be represented as sub-state groups, their existence may require 
redefinitions of political spaces. Fourthly, in some of the next wave accession states, national 
minority identities are often stronger and less fluid than those in the EU15 member states. 
These national minorities have shown particularly strong abilities to mobilize politically, 
drawing on long-term histories and self-identification as sub-state ‘national minority regions’ 
(NMRs), contrasting with the national majority identities and political systems. As the EU 
aims to counter the ‘democratic deficit’ with greater co-decision powers at all levels, these 
national minorities may mobilize not only as cultural forces but also as social forces. 
Certainly, in the new Europe where the proposed constitutional arrangement suggests 
increased respect for cultural diversity, and the Multi-Level Governance (MLG) system being 
put in place has recognized the value of regions, whether multicultural or mono-national, 
                                                 
1 Special thanks to research assistant Lucia Pantella. 
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whether self-administering or self-governing, national minorities in historic regions represent 
the variety and heterogeneity of identities with which the new multi-level system of 
governance will have to contend. Assuming that the EU would wish to ensure ethical political 
integration of these into a pan-European context of good governance, the new EU is not only 
confronted with problems of how to integrate new economies and polities but must also 
contemplate the accommodation of a plethora of new identities.  
 
1. EU Multi-Level Governance (MLG) 
With the emergence of multi-level governance (MLG) in European integration during the last 
decade of the twentieth century, local and regional authorities have come to play 
incrementally a greater role in EU policy-making. The Maastricht Treaty established the CoR 
and adopted the principle of subsidiarity as a guide to the division of competences within the 
Union. Subsequent treaties have expanded the role of the CoR and refined the scope and reach 
of the subsidiarity principle. Sub-national authorities have thus come to constitute a so-called 
‘third level’ integration,2 the first level being the supra level and the second the member state 
level. The politics of the third level is rather complex as it involves different units in different 
member states and receives competency rights on some issues but not on others. Moreover, in 
some member states it draws strong attention and engagement from decision-making 
politicians while in others it is a politics largely disregarded. In some member states third 
level integration actors represent national minorities while in others national minorities are 
‘invisible’ at this level of politics. This may of course be contributed to the diverse and 
heterogeneous character of national minority populations and histories in member states. 
While in some member states NMRs are historically established and autonomous, in others 
they have only recently begun to identify as ‘regions’ of the third level politics. The national 
identity of many member states is therefore essentially contested as sub-national groups 
mobilize on the basis of separate identities linked to sub-state regions and localities.  
 
However, the main thrust in political integration of the EU continues to be linked to territory, 
the territory of the sovereign member states. Territory defines the political power of the 
member state.3 It supports prevailing views of citizenship, identity, culture and rights, and 
legitimizes the use of control. Territory provides the space for social and economic 
interaction; it sustains human life and from territory springs solidarity. Member states 
subdivide sovereign territory for economic and democratic purposes, the aim and scope of 
which differ from member state to member state. Some subdivide on purely economic lines, 
many subdivide on the basis of geographical definitions, and a few have subdivided along the 
lines of sub-national identities. Many have employed a combination of these. In those states 
where subdivision is along the lines of sub-national identities, these identities are often linked 
to the national identity of a neighbouring state (Alto Adige, Italy, Flanders, Belgium, Western 
Poland, Narva, Estonia, Daugavpils, Latvia, Hungarians in Slovakia and Turks in Cyprus), or 
they may have unique characteristics (Wales, Scotland, the autonomous Spanish regions and 
Brittany, France). While most member states respect sub-state national identities, some new 
and old member states have created subdivisions that divide, or virtually ‘bury’, socially 
cohesive sub-state national groups administratively (Slovakia and Denmark). In other new 
member states, sub-state national groups are so small that they may not possibly be defined by 
subdivision but may perhaps be dominant in smaller units, such as municipalities (Estonia and 
Latvia). More importantly, in some accession and candidate states, sub-state identities are 
                                                 
2 Udo Bullmann, “The Politics of the Third Level”, in Charlie Jeffery (ed.), The Regional Dimension of the 
European Union. Towards a Third Level in Europe? (Frank Cass, London, 1997). 
3 Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe. Territorial Restructuring and Political Change  
(Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1998). 
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strongly attached to territory and kin-state identity (Transylvania, Hungary, and Krajina, 
Croatia). One example is unique in that sub-national identity is in fact formed and redefined 
in diaspora communities in the EU (South East Anatolia, Turkey).  
 
The sheer heterogeneity of these groups presents the EU with a number of new challenges in 
terms of integration. How will these NMR behave in the new EU25 and beyond? How will 
they mobilize at the member state level to influence the supra-state level? The answer to these 
questions is significant for the stability of Europe. How will they mobilize together across 
member state borders? This is significant for the future of EU politics. Which issues will they 
mobilize around? This is important for EU policy and the current division of competences in 
the EU. Which tools will they implement to influence Brussels decision-making? This is 
significant for the architecture of Europe. Will they lobby directly or will they cooperate with 
the existing structures of member states? Will they pressure the CoR to redefine and 
restructure? These are but a few issues of the salient question: Europe, whither? 
 
In the CoR, the third level of governance consists of local (municipalities) and regional 
(regions) authorities. Nevertheless, where sub-state national groups have autonomy and 
perhaps self-government rights, their political power is considerably stronger at the member 
state level than at the EU level. While this has at times created frictions and disgruntling, 
leading for instance to a group of sub-state regions with legislative powers to form their own 
alliance and seeking influence on the design of the new Europe, these sub-state identities have 
not, however, been so strong as to result in major territorial break-up. However, in some of 
the new member states where local and regional authorities have recently been established 
and where strong sub-state national identities have not always been taken into consideration, 
the European political space for integration may face problems of how to accommodate these 
sub-state identities. The political mobilization of these sub-state identities, either within the 
system of subdivision of member states or by using other methodologies, will challenge the 
extent to which political integration at the EU level adapts to ever diverse identities.  
 
The views of the impact of this political integration in the EU vary. While some argue that the 
emergence of a so-called ‘new regionalism’ will result in a weakening of member state 
boundaries4 and thus perhaps the elimination of the member state level, others argue that the 
new regionalism in fact means stronger and more politicized regions and thus a buttressing of 
the three levels.5 If the twentieth century was the era of consolidating Europe at the state level 
to counter the emergence of further major bellicose conflicts, the twenty-first century may be 
seen as the era where the EU consolidates at the regional level to counter emerging culture 
conflicts. Certainly, the EU has seen the need to address the growing ‘democratic deficit’ 
resulting from the state-level consolidation by expanding its system of governance to include 
those authorities that are closest to the individual citizen, i.e., the local and regional 
authorities. It is not unlikely that the EU will also have to address a ‘culture deficit’ by 
addressing the stronger sub-national identities. The incorporation of such identities into the 
common European society may therefore require alternative approaches to MLG.  
 
2. The National Minority ‘Region’ 
Although the Laeken Declaration established regions as potential co-architects of a new and 
more democratic EU, it did not, however, define a ‘region’. The word region is used in many 
                                                 
4 Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers – Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1996), 106-70. 
5 Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe…, Chapter 7. 
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different ways.6 Strictly defined, a region connotes physical contiguity. But proximity is also 
a characteristic of a region. Thus, when defining a region at the member state level, it would 
seem a prerequisite to be a region is that the territory in question is contiguous and in 
proximity of the member state. This is not to be confused with groupings of states defined by 
homogeneity. This can be social homogeneity based on race, religion, language or history but 
it can also, and more often is, be based on economic homogeneity. Finally, a region of states 
can of course be based on political homogeneity, as is the case in the European region, which 
is now largely defined as a homogenous region in terms of democracy. Regionalism, on the 
other hand, refers to a set of attitudes, loyalties and ideas, which influence the identities of the 
people inhabiting the region. In a sense, regionalism is to regions what nationalism is to 
‘nation-states’.7 At the inter-state level, these visions often result in institutional frameworks 
based on regional themes, such as security, democratization or indeed integration.  
 
Thus, the definition of a region is contested.8 A ‘region’ may also be seen as a social 
construction within territorial boundaries. The territorial element is fundamental even if it is 
not its precise delineation, and the social, economic and political content of regionalism and 
the identity of the people living in the ‘region’ vary according to the outcomes of political and 
historical processes. But significantly, it is a social force in addition to being a separate 
historical and linguistic entity. Regions where national minorities are in the majority have also 
been termed nations or sub-state nations. This is of course for the purpose of delineating the 
contrast to the nation of the majority. In some cases, these may even be seen as co-nations.9 
Co-nations are cultural groups that are socially cohesive and who represent a strong social 
force at the political level based on a separate sub-state nationalism. 
 
The post-Cold War era saw a rise of sub-state nationalisms in the new member states and 
accession states. These sub-state nationalisms asserted a strong sense of cultural 
distinctiveness and some made or implied demands for economic and political self-
determination driven by a potentially different logic that draws on strong ties to history and 
territory, builds on deep collective solidarity, cultural affinity and exclusive membership. 
Sub-state groups with such potentially strong national identities different from that of the 
majority are usually referred to as ethnic minorities because they may be distinguished from 
the majority in terms of language, perhaps religion, certainly culture and ethnicity. However, 
they may more correctly be considered national minorities where there is the proximity of a 
kin-state. In either case, they are driven by a desire for cultural survival, both in terms of 
culture and language, but also in terms of national sentiments attached to a territory. Most 
important though, they represent a sub-state national identity, which stands in contrast to the 
national identity of the majority. Sub-state nationalisms, whether kin-state related or 
independent, may therefore represent strong social forces in addition to representing 
antagonistic cultural forces.  
 
An example of a new NMR in the EU15 member states is Brittany. Brittany represents an 
example of a reformulation and redefinition of an ancient and unique European minority 
identity attached to a ‘region’. In the new member states a number of new NMRs are in the 
                                                 
6 Michael Keating and John Loughlin (eds.), The Political Economy of Regionalism (Frank Cass, London, 1996). 
7 Evans, Graham and Newham, Jeffrey, The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations (Penguin Books, 
London, 1998) 473-74. 
8 Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe…, 13. 
9 The Cluj Declaration adopted by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) on 25 October 
1992. See also: Tove Malloy, National Minority Rights in Europe, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
Forthcoming, 2005). 
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making. Examples are Narva, Estonia; Daugavpils, Latvia; Upper Silesia, Poland; Southern 
Slovakia, Transylvania, Romania and Northern Cyprus. All of these ‘regions’ represent 
conventional national minority areas with close proximity to a kin-state either within the EU 
or outside. Northern Cyprus is perhaps the exception as the separation of the island has for 
decades been seen as a self-determination issue. But this view is currently changing as the EU 
is committing funds to help bring the ‘region’ out of isolation, thus influencing the character 
of the issue through economic empowerment. Nevertheless, it should not be disregarded that 
it remains the only case of an unrecognized but de facto secession in the EU25. Many of these 
NMRs represent strong national minority identities which have been experiencing 
considerable discrimination and, in some cases, second-class citizenship status. Finally, a 
unique case of a redefining and reconstituting national minority is South East Anatolia in 
Turkey, which is constituted in exile. For brief descriptions of each of these NMRs, see 
Section IV. 
 
3. The Issues of NMRs in the Making 
EU integration is an historical process , which over the last half century has sought to 
integrate European states economically and, more recently, politically. This is a process that is 
far from finished and which has seen much energy spent on the reconciliation of divergent 
political and economic systems as well as diverse national identities. At a time when it was 
beginning to attain a common identity, at least at the economic level, geo-politics suddenly 
confronted Europe with the inevitable choice of integrating yet another set of politico-
economic systems and national identities. However, the post-1989 systems and identities 
draw on a very different history, a history of suppressed identities and strategies. Moreover, 
the new national majority identities are far more contested than in Western Europe. The new 
national majority identities are, in many cases, revived identities, which in their revival have 
come to discover that they are not homogeneous identities. Indeed, most of them consist of 
sub-national identities in addition to the Westphalian defined identity. Thus, European 
integration is faced with not one new identity per one new member state but several new 
identities per new member state. This is arguably a new social and cultural space to which the 
EU will have to adapt. When these diverse national and sub-national identities mobilize to 
influence the EU decision-making process, the EU may have to revisit its conventional views 
of national identities and national power. This is why the current MLG scheme must connect 
with the potential mobilization of new sub-national identities representing a variety and 
heterogeneity of social and cultural narratives telling different stories. The relevance of the 
long-term historical processes of these new identities to European integration should not be 
under-estimated. These new identities bring to the European table a different history, different 
customs and conventions, and different intellectual and cultural frameworks often unknown to 
the rest of the EU.  
 
The process of NMR mobilization in Europe has followed different paths in East and West 
Europe. While in Western Europe the administration of economic integration processes 
required vertical decentralization in the 1980s, the need to move toward democratic systems 
of governing as well as the jockeying for position to become members of EU influenced the 
way in which post-Communist states decentralized in the 1990s. In Western Europe, 
established NMRs such as Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Alto Adige and 
the Belgian NMRs survived the decentralization process due to their strong sub-state 
identities and histories as semi-independent units. In Eastern Europe, NMRs were faced with 
legacies of central distribution on the one hand and globalization demands on the other. At the 
same time, political liberalization and democratic procedures created space for regional 
diversity and local government. And last but not least, the knowledge and availability of EU 
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funds propelled regions and emerging NMRs into the arena of European politics.10 Thus, in 
this landscape, incentives for NMRs to mobilize politically for their own social and economic 
prosperity appear strong.  
 
Academic studies of this phenomenon have focused on the institutional, cultural and 
structure-agency aspects of NMRs, including institutional analyses of transition histories, 
political and administrative sub-state arrangements and political mobilizations, cultural 
anthropological overviews of national minority histories and identities, and structure-agency 
analyses of social and political issues related to European social and territorial cohesion.  
 
The making of NMRs is determined by the availability of a number of factors which facilitate 
the mobilization force. In fact, the degree of availability may influence the degree to which 
political mobilization happens. Although the making of NMRs is actor-oriented and the 
existence of elites is vital to success, external factors are the facilitators that fuel the engine. 
The legal framework and the existence of autonomous institutions at the level of the ‘region’ 
are perhaps the most defining aspect of the force of political mobilization. If the legal 
framework is oppressive of national minorities seeking self-promotion, the more likely it is 
that the political mobilization force aims at the external level and the EU level. In the new 
member states in Eastern Europe particular, the history of transition plays a major role in how 
national minorities will act in third level integration politics. Not only recent history but also 
pre-Communist and Cold War history impacts on the way in which national minorities react 
to the display of opportunities offered by EU membership. If NMRs with strong identities 
suffered oblivion during the Communist era, they are more likely to seek restitution of these 
identities in the public’s mind. This identity discourse thus may spill over into the strategies 
national minorities devise for the socio-economic development of their ‘regions’. Drawing on 
strong identities provides resources for institution building in the NMR and thus strengthens 
the ability and possibilities to act and interact politically both at the international and at the 
supra-state levels. Seeing the making of NMRs as an isolated intra-state phenomenon is thus 
no longer feasible and the aspects of Europeanization and internationalization are perhaps the 
strongest factors in the changing fabric of not only member states but also the European 
mosaic of diverse identities. A closer look at each of these aspects of making NMRs reveals a 
diversity not only in identities but also in cultures and manners in which these new member 
state identities may approach third level integration.  
 
The taming of ethnic nationalism and the dismantling of authoritarianism were the major 
tasks of democratization in all states in transition. This process was complicated by the weak 
state syndrome – a hallmark of transition – which discourages state authorities from sharing 
power with an equally weak civil society, let alone with different ethnic groups.11 As this 
syndrome motivated the national majority to concentrate all power in its own hands, questions 
of the transition history are vital to explicating national minority political mobilization, or 
lack thereof, in the subsequent institutional set-up. Dilemmas and paradoxes experienced 
during post-Communist transition have influenced the post-Communist state design and the 
existence of national minorities has had implications for reforms and democratic transition. 
The legacy of socialism in elite action in terms of oligarchism and opportunity has 
constrained the shift to modern democratic institutionalism. 
                                                 
10 Melanie Tatur (ed.), The Making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe - the Impact of Culture, Economic 
Structure and Institutions: Case Studies from Poland, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine (VS Verlag Für 
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2004). 
11 Priit Järve, “Introduction”, in Sammy Smooha and Priit Järve (eds.), The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-
Communist Europe, Budapest, Local Government and Public Service Reform (ECMI/LGI, 2005).  
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The example of Estonia is instructive. Estonia’s peaceful secession from the Soviet Union 
was accompanied by anxiety concerning the creation of a ‘pure’ Estonian identity. For this 
reason, when Estonia restored its independence in 1991, Soviet-era settlers and their 
descendants were denied any automatic right to Estonian citizenship.12 After the adoption of 
the Law on Aliens in 1993 by the Estonian Parliament, the ethnic Russian minority felt 
threatened by the possibility of being expelled. The Law on Aliens stated that non-citizens 
would have to apply for residence and work permits along with travel documents. Those, who 
did not apply or had their applications rejected could face expulsion from Estonia, being 
considered to be staying illegally on its territory. In response to this law, the Russians living 
in Narva and Sillamae prepared for local referenda on the issue of autonomy. The Estonian 
government declared the referenda illegal and threatened to use force if necessary to prevent 
the break-up of Estonia. Russian vigilante groups began to arm themselves and, in Russia, the 
President warned that he would intervene if necessary to protect the rights of Russian 
speakers. It was due mainly to the intervention of the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities who met with representatives of the Narva city council and President Meri of 
Estonia, that the tension between state and national minority was alleviated. The EU 
enlargement process since 1995 and the Copenhagen criteria have pushed Estonia to improve 
the legislation on national minorities, especially concerning the citizenship and language 
issues, and the EU continues to voice support for the integration of the Russian-speaking 
community in the socio-political Estonian institutions. 
 
Transition history is not, however, defined purely by the state of post-Communism. In 
Northern Cyprus, transition history is in the making, as reflected in the recent changes in the 
enclave’s achieved favouritism after the rejection in the South of the referendum on 
reunification based on the so-called Annan Plan. And transition history, in terms of third level 
integration, is not merely a new member state phenomenon. In France, the recent district 
changes have influenced the way the region of Brittany has rediscovered its cultural roots and 
renewed its interest in functioning as a NMR. While tense minority-majority relations are 
most often the reason why post-independence institutionalization does not fall out in favour of 
national minorities, peaceful relations between national minorities and the majority are largely 
dependent on the degree to which national minorities are ensured a voice in the decision-
making process. Systems of group representation vary from member state to member state, 
and the extent to which a state is centralized, decentralized or devolved in terms of power. 
Although demands for group representation appeal to some of the most basic practices and 
principles of representative democracy,13 governments are often strongly opposed to 
institutionalizing group differences in terms of political representation, holding that this goes 
against the general tenets of liberal democracy and the individual’s right to a voice. Other 
aspects of minorities-majority tensions are related to cultural rights and freedoms. 
Discrimination in access to public administration jobs and other employment is often cause 
for friction, as is the right to education in national minority languages. Legal frameworks also 
play a vital role in minority-majority relations, especially in regard to a political voice. 
Problems of second-class citizenship, quiet discrimination, social and economic exclusion, 
marginalization and invisibility represent the dark side of minority-majority relations and thus 
impacts on the capability of NMRs to mobilize politically.  
 
                                                 
12 David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, multiculturalism and EU enlargement: the case of Estonia”, 1 JEMIE 
(2003). 
13 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995), Chapter 7. 
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Specifically, for post-Communist states in transition, political institutionalization introduced a 
variety of other dilemmas, which has influenced the reluctance to devolve power to sub-state 
units of national minorities. These included the relation between old and new systems, or the 
combination thereof, and the path-dependency resulting from this. Depending on the speed 
with which the old systems adopted to economic liberalization and democratization, the post-
Communist institutionalization process retained degrees of authoritarian policies to the 
detriment of national minorities wishing to self-promote their ‘regions’. The availability of 
resources was another factor in the democratization process that resulted in continuity in 
change. Modernization and its resulting spheres of sociological vacuum influenced the way in 
which national minorities were able to mobilize, especially in those states where the transition 
from heavy industry resulted in high social costs. Corruption and clientelism also worked to 
the detriment of national minorities seeking power-sharing, resulting in virtual culture gaps 
between identities in power and identities without power.  
 
As the legal frameworks and systematization of the access of national minorities to the 
democratic process were cast during a period of heavy Europeanization, institutionalization 
became heavily influenced by European normative standards on human rights and minority 
rights rather than power-sharing. This type of Europeanization began with the new 
democracies in Central and Eastern Europe seeking membership of the Council of Europe and 
the CSCE/OSCE, which was largely seen as the path to membership of NATO and the EU. 
But this type of Europeanization constituted mainly a first step Europeanization. Once 
memberships had been obtained or promised, and the path towards adopting normative 
standards had begun, a second step Europeanization took place, focusing on the 
institutionalization of post-Communist states in relation to the traditional Western European 
concept of market economy with emphasis on the influence of late modern production 
structures, such as growth and competitiveness, technology, communication and scientific 
research. This process is far more fluid and competitive, and difficult to map. The EU’s 
Cohesion Policy has a great deal to do with this process as it influences the way in which 
Europeanization informs the political mobilization of NMRs and the ability of the NMRs to 
tap into the funds distributed under this policy. The capacity of NMRs to mobilize lobbying 
mechanisms both at the level of the central member state government and the supra-state level 
in Brussels is therefore significant to this policy. Thus, European spaces have been created in 
which established NMRs and aspiring ‘regions’ interface with each other and with the 
institutions of the internal market economy.  
 
Kin-state relations are another key tool in the making of NMRs. While it may not seem overly 
important to the former EU12 and EU15 member states as half a century of integration and 
peace has mellowed sentiments and redirected sympathies, it has often been good kin-state 
relations that contributed to the forging of peace in border regions, such as in the case of the 
Danish-German or the Austrian-Italian border regions. In the EU25 realm, a century of 
Communist hegemony and other totalitarian ideologies restraining national minority identities 
must be taken into account as it has resulted in not only suppressed identities but also 
suppressed geo-political strategies. Although geo-political strategies would seem anathema to 
EU integration, the sentiments driving such suppressed strategies may not have abated. 
Certainly, the case of Cyprus is presenting the EU with this type of dilemma. Another 
example of this may be the so-called Status Law adopted by the Hungarian Parliament in June 
2001 to support Hungarians in neighbouring countries in various ways financially and with 
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regard to education and employment.14 As this law seeks to establish a legal relationship 
between the home-state and kin abroad and, in this sense, sets up a ‘transnational’ or a cross-
border form of ‘citizenship’, kin-state relations take on a nineteenth century character. Unlike 
the bilateral Bonn-Copenhagen Declarations, which initiated similar type protection, the 
Hungarian law was a unilateral move disliked by its neighbours. Hungary committed itself to 
repeal before accession to the EU any provision that  
would not be compatible with EC law. In the case of the Northern Cyprus-Turkey 
relationship, matters are even more volatile in that Turkey maintains up to 30,000 troops in 
Northern Cyprus. The existence of ‘foreign’ troops on EU territory is thus another matter 
related to national minority identity for which the EU will have to prepare.  
 
The relevance of national minority histories to NMR mobilization is particularly acute in 
Europe. National minority existence as a concept, and the recognition of national minority 
membership go back to the 1815 Congress of Vienna15 and perhaps even further.16 The 
existence of national minorities has continued to dominate the agenda of European politics 
since Vienna, some times more prominent than others.17 Especially, after each major bellicose 
conflict, the issue has sought resolve and each time the histories of national minorities have 
been replete with resettlements, redefinitions, restructuring and false reassurances. Indeed, 
during times of major upheavals, national minorities have been thrown into tumultuous 
periods of uncertainty about belonging. As a result, the social forces of national minorities 
have become strengthened in the bonds of suppressed identities that tied them to the territory 
rather than to the ever-changing state. National minority identities are thus more likely to 
forge independent action in an effort to protect against the rule of overlords.  
 
National minority identity is a phenomenon ascribed from the membership of the societies to 
which national minorities belong: family, religion, and the nation. As societies establish 
identities, and identities form the norms and conventions of societies, national minority 
identities become historically attached to the values of the society to which the national 
minority belong. National minority identities thus become dependent on cultural survival and 
demonstrate high-level self-preserving energy.18 In this process, national minority identities 
are almost always in tension with the national identity of the majority, and especially NMR 
identities include aspects of contrasting identities as national minority identities often contrast 
with the national identity of the majority in control. National minority identities are therefore 
an ‘us-them’ syndrome involving aspects of ‘friend-enemy’ and modus vivendi theory and so 
the relevance of national minority identities as social capital mobilizing politically becomes 
particularly acute. Particularly important here is the link between national minority identities 
and the mobilization of social capital. Social capital refers to features of social organization, 
                                                 
14 The law was designed to foster the position of Hungarian minorities abroad and granted them, on the basis of 
registration in Hungary, certain rights and privileges in the areas of education and culture. One of the law's major 
provisions allows kin-state Hungarians to work in Hungary for a three-month period each year; it offers financial 
support for public-transportation costs as well as assistance for students in institutions of higher education while 
they are in Hungary; and it extends assistance to Hungarians abroad who have more than two children in 
Hungarian-language schools. In exchange, the Hungarians beyond the borders have to do little more than 
establish their credentials as ethnic Magyars. 
15 Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
16 Geoff Gilbert, “Religio-nationalist minorities and the development of minority rights law”, Review of 
International Studies, 25 (1999), 389-410. 
17 Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-states System (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1998).  
18 Philip Allott, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990). Of the same 
author see also, The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2002). 
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such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
collective action in terms of associational life, local media, political participation, and 
political party formation.19 It is a theory of civic capacity, which has seldom been put in the 
context of national minority identity. This is a theory which argues that institutions are 
constructed by human beings and inhabited by humans self-identifying towards specific but 
multi-layered social and cultural constructs. As symbolic resources may play an important 
part in this identity formation, the social resources and capital draw on the history and 
territory of the NMR when mobilizing for political power-sharing. 
 
The functional dynamic of economic restructuring is another powerful force behind national 
minority mobilization.20 As new territorial hierarchies and new systems of action seek to 
escape the control of central governments, local policy makers seek to maximize the capacity 
of their territory to compete by emphasizing its human capital and other resources. Through 
mobilizing local energies in an effort to compete in the global economic restructuring and 
technological change, NMRs become active political players at the international level, 
perhaps even before they find a voice at the state level. In this dynamic, NMRs can draw 
additionally on strong identities and systems of solidarity and may prove more powerful and 
successful in developing their societies. Path-dependency in terms of reinforced institutions, 
formal as well as informal, cultural and ethnic, through the rationality of actors calculating 
costs and benefits, reproducing institutional opportunities while drawing on cultural codes, 
ideologies and world views determine the degree of mobilization.21 Other theoretical 
frameworks include cultural tool kits in terms of historical and territorial self-identification 
turned into action. Clientelism can thus also work to the benefit of national minorities. At the 
informal level, nostalgic narratives, reference to stories, codes, values and norms can also 
influence the strength with which political mobilization happens. The making of NMRs 
therefore refers to institutional arrangements, social fabric, networks and discourses as well as 
strategies, social construction, self-identification and collective identification.   
 
As post-Communist states went through political transition, national minority mobilization of 
social capital also became dependent on social and economic changes in terms of both 
outcomes and opportunities. This resulted in different scenarios as to the way in which NMRs 
sought to influence their future existence, both as political actors and social human beings. 
For instance, dissatisfaction with the ability of central governments to procure resources and 
development aid for NMRs in Western Europe manifested itself in local policy makers 
seeking to influence decisions in Brussels otherwise reserved for the supra-state level. 
Another aspect is the varied level of social and economic development in NMRs. Some 
NMRs are more successful in obtaining funds than other regions. As they liaise, they may 
create coalitions to lobby for increased funding for the regions. Thus, the interactive process 
of structuration,22 including the invention of new strategies of interaction and collective 
action creates opportunities through existing frameworks, including legal frameworks, as well 
as inventing new frameworks and using horizontal and vertical alliances of trust-building.  
 
The example of the Hungarian minority in Romania shows how trust and existing frameworks 
are important factors. Although the economic situation of the Hungarians in Romania is 
                                                 
19 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, (Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey, 1993) 
20 Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe… . 
21 Melanie Tatur (ed.), The Making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe- the Impact of Culture…, 29. 
22 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1984). 
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mixed, the Hungarians in Transylvania have gained certain advantages in the private sector, 
since many of them were familiar with the economic situation and model in Hungary. They 
are also linked by family and friendly ties with Hungary and benefit from them in business. 
As a result, a stratum receptive to entrepreneurship appeared relatively early after the 
beginning of transition and started to work more efficiently than was the case with the 
Romanian population. Thus, participation in private business is vital to Romania’s 
Hungarians. This is the sector where Hungarian entrepreneurs face the least institutional 
barriers and where, both in services and in production, one easily finds very profitable and 
presently unsupplied sectors. In their endeavours to expand, cooperation with foreign partners 
is often considered more effective. Of course, foreign cooperation is primarily with Hungarian 
partners in the motherland. Hungary is one of the largest investors in Romania and the base 
capital of registered companies is in the three digit millions. This indicates that there is 
considerable interest on both sides to develop economic relations. As such, it constitutes a 
force by which the Hungarians develop their international relations through their kin-state.  
 
However, horizontal internationalization of NMRs happens at different levels and implements 
varied tools. Social capital is also in focus in terms of mobilizing horizontal international 
networks. This is the view that dominant functions and processes in the information age are 
increasingly organized around networks. Networks constitute the new social morphology of 
our societies and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and 
outcomes in the processes of production, experience, power and culture. While the 
networking form of social organization has existed in other times and spaces, the new 
information technology paradigm provides the basis for its pervasive expansion throughout 
the entire social structure.23 This network logic or form of organization induces a social 
determination at a higher level, one that was unknown before. With regard to NMRs, this is 
particularly relevant as the causal power of network flows becomes more important than the 
specific interests they represent, the flows of power. It becomes vital to be present in a 
network and not to be excluded from it. Hence, the emergence of the space of a new ‘politics 
of third level integration’. 
 
 
II  NMRs AND THIRD LEVEL POLITICS 
 
Third level integration is a concept related to the aspects of decentralization and multi-level 
governance in the EU institutional set-up, and these are related to the problematique of the 
democratic deficit that gained authority in the late 1980s.24 Decentralization refers both to the 
function of vertical delegation and/or sharing of powers within member states, which took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s and to the horizontal power-sharing which began in the 1990s as 
a result of the democratic deficit debate. The latter form of decentralization was largely a 
result of the erosion of the role of member state parliaments by the increasing centralization 
that followed the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. Not only member states’ parliaments 
but also the parliaments of NMRs and other regions, which held self-governing powers at the 
national level felt sidelined by the forces of integration towards a unified political approach. 
This led to significant criticism of the hegemonic political decision-making in Brussels and 
eventually to the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty. 
Today, we speak not of decentralization but of subsidiarity. Although the normativity of the 
                                                 
23 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000). 
24 For a good discussion of this, see Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as 
Good as it Gets?” in J. H. H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), Rethinking European Constitutionalism (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
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principle of subsidiarity was not immediately legitimized and institutionalized, the system of 
MLG emerged largely as the result of the adoption of the principle of subsidiarity and hence 
forced the principle to become normatively accepted and implemented. The result was the 
materialization of a horizontal system of governance. Heretofore, NMRs have only had a 
place in the vertical system.  
 
It is debatable how powerful the politics of third level is and, certainly, the importance of 
NMRs in this discourse is still low if not insignificant. The number of national minorities that 
are members of the CoR is small and the visibility of new NMRs in the new member states is 
minimal at this point. The funds that these regions wish to receive from the EU are still, by 
and large, accessible only via the intermediary of the capitals of member states. Moreover, the 
period between the Maastricht and the Amsterdam treaties, which was seen largely as a 
‘farewell to the third level’ due to the weak powers of the CoR,25 will only be reversed by the 
set-up of the horizontal co-governance system envisaged in the Constitution for Europe. 
However, this system is virtually identical to the system stipulated by the German Länder in 
1990 when they were lobbying strongly for the enactment of the third level. Although there 
was perhaps a disillusion with the politics of the third level in the mid-1990s, it is fair to say 
that the early part of the twenty-first century has seen a revival, especially in connection with 
the two intergovernmental conferences leading up to the Treaty of Nice in 2000 and the 
adoption of the Constitution in 2004. This has manifested itself in a number of ways at the 
horizontal level.  
 
1. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) 
The CoR consists of members representing regional (regions) and local (municipalities) 
authorities that either hold electoral mandate or are politically accountable to an assembly 
elected by direct universal suffrage.26 The members are nominated by member states and 
appointed by the Council for four-year terms. Each member state has its own selection 
procedure for members, and Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Portugal allocate seats to autonomous 
regions. Germany and Austria allocate seats to the Länder, and Germany includes 
representatives from the Länder as observers in its delegation to the Commission. According 
to the Maastricht Treaty, the Council and the Commission were obliged to consult with the 
CoR in five areas: Economic and Social Cohesion, Trans-European infrastructure networks, 
Health, Education and Culture. The Amsterdam Treaty added a further five areas for 
consultation: Employment Policy, Social Policy, Environment, Vocational training and  
Transport. Outside these areas, the Commission, the Council and the EP have the option to 
consult the CoR on an issue if they see important regional or local implications to a proposal. 
The CoR can also draw up opinions on its own initiative, enabling it to put issues on the 
agenda. Its work is organized through six commissions, made up of CoR members and 
specializing in particular policy areas. The commissions draw up draft opinions on the 
European Commission’s proposals. The draft opinion must be approved at one of five plenary 
sessions each year, before being sent to the Commission, the Council and EP. The Bureau is 
the driving political force behind CoR. It draws up the political programme at the start of each 
new term, oversees its implementation and generally coordinates the work of the plenary 
sessions and of the commissions.  
 
The historical road towards third level integration began with the adoption of the 1986 Single 
European Act (SEA), which signified a strengthening of the central power and thus alarmed 
                                                 
25 Jeffery in Charles Jeffrey (ed.), The Regional Dimension of European Union…, 64-65. 
26 CoR Resolution of 3 June 1999 amended the Maastricht Treaty. 
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those regions that had traditionally held a high degree of self-government, such as the German 
Länder. The increased salience of regions within member states, in particular federal systems 
as Belgium and Germany, coincided with the broader political developments of the European 
supranational integration.27 Especially, the German Länder felt increasingly threatened in 
their prerogatives vis-à-vis the federal level by the way in which European measures were 
implemented. Traditional prerogatives of the Länder were being eroded because of EC 
directives, which made national governments responsible for their implementation. Therefore 
the Länder insisted on being represented in the Council of Ministers when this dealt with 
issues falling within their range of competence. Consequently, they initiated a series of 
conferences entitled the ‘Europe of the Regions’ with the aim of putting the question of 
federal Europe onto the political agenda. Similarly, the Belgian sub-state authorities, created 
during the period from 1988 to 1993, were keenly in favour of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. The 
Spanish Autonomous Communities, like the German Länder, and the Italian regions also had 
motives for supporting a ‘Europe of the Regions’. Moreover, the 1988 reform of the 
Structural Funds marked an important turning point in the relations between regions and the 
European Community. Thus, the increasing regional demands for a formal right to be 
represented at the European Community level, combined with the European Commission’s 
own desire to reinforce regional consultation procedures, prompted the creation in 1988 of the 
Consultative Council of Regional and Local Authorities,28 the immediate precursor of the 
CoR. Being a weak and fragmented body, the Council revealed itself not capable of putting 
any pressure on the European institutions. But pressure for greater access to decision-making 
for regions continued to increase, especially under the leading role of the German Länder. A 
Conference of Heads of Governments and Minister-Presidents of the European Regions was 
set up with the aim of demanding the insertion of the principle of subsidiarity into the EC 
Treaty and the creation of a consultative Regional Council. The Commission strongly 
supported the idea of a ‘Committee of the Regions’, which could reduce the perceived 
democratic deficit and represent a good ally. This eventually led the European Council to 
accept the establishment of the CoR, which was officially established in 1994 under 
Maastricht Treaty Article 263. Subsequent treaties have expanded the role of the CoR and 
refined the scope and reach of the subsidiarity principle.  
 
While the principle of subsidiarity together with the related proportionality principle did not 
become fully operational until the Amsterdam Treaty, the Maastricht Treaty established it as a 
last resort protection mechanism for member states to use when in voting minority on a 
specific issue. Thus, the principle of subsidiarity was meant to regulate the exercise of powers 
and was seen as a vital democracy tool assuring the individual member states leverage where 
there was a question of equal or joint competence. On this view, the instigation of the 
subsidiarity principle was one of the stages in European constitutionalism where the politics 
of integration addressed the supremacy of state sovereignty.  
 
The bottom line of the subsidiarity principle is to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as 
possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made as to whether action at Community 
level is justified in the light of the possibilities available at member state level. Specifically, it 
is the principle that the EU does not take action unless it is deemed more effective than action 
at the member state level. Thus, it is closely tied to the principles of proportionality and 
necessity, which require that any action by the EU should not go beyond what is necessary to 
                                                 
27 John Loughlin, “Representing Regions in Europe: The Committee of the Regions”, in Charles Jeffrey (ed.), 
The Regional Dimension of European Union… . 
28 The Consultative Council consisted of 21 members of the local level and 21 of the regional level, proposed by 
the main organization of local and regional authorities and nominated by the Commission. 
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achieve the objectives of the treaties. However, the justiciability of the principle of 
subsidiarity – which is entrusted to the ECJ – is the object of much debate with regards to its 
feasibility. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty unfortunately did not establish the criteria for the 
sharing of powers and responsibilities among all levels of government. With the Amsterdam 
Treaty, the principle became more operational and the CoR was included in the bodies that 
the Commission and the Council could consult.29 The 2001 Laeken Declaration on the future 
of the EU raised questions to be addressed by the Convention to draft the Constitution for 
Europe in terms of democratic governance in relation to the citizens of Europe and stipulated 
that the challenge of reform would have to address again the question of competence 
including the competence of regions.30 Although there was not much attention devoted to 
regions in the Convention drafting the Constitution, there was nonetheless widespread support 
for including regions more solidly in the Constitution. Consequently, in the Constitution for 
Europe adopted in 2004, the CoR’s status will be elevated to that of an advisory body on 
equal footing with the Social and Economic Committee, and it has been entrusted with the 
right to petition the ECJ on matters related to the exercise of the principle of subsidiarity. The 
latter is a considerable empowerment of the body, which began its life in 1994 essentially as a 
discussion club. The principle of subsidiarity thus has direct relevance for those national 
minorities who either have self-government and legislative powers or hold majority in local 
government but may also indirectly influence national minorities active in local government.  
 
In the Constitution for Europe the principle of subsidiarity is carried over in its original form 
but amended with reference to local and regional authorities. Article I-11(3) holds that:  
 
in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only if 
and insofar as the objectives of the intended action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union 
level.31  
 
The successful elevation of the CoR in the new Constitution was the result of hard work by 
both the CoR and a group of its members with self-government rights. The latter, dissatisfied 
with the weak powers afforded the CoR in the 1990s, founded an informal cooperative 
venture of twenty powerful autonomous regions with legislative powers in 2000 to lobby the 
intergovernmental conference drafting the Treaty of Nice. United in the Conference of the 
Presidents of Regions with Legislative Powers (RegLeg), these regions represented around 
56% of EU’s population. While not successful with the Treaty of Nice, the RegLeg pressured 
their state representatives to ensure greater inclusion at the level of regions in the new 
Constitution. Thus, it has been argued that the real leverage in the Convention was not the six 
representatives of the CoR but the lobbying of the RegLeg.32 This is likely to be true as they 
have the possibility to influence EU politics through their member state parliaments. 
Moreover, some of them usually represent strong economic forces and are thus able to 
influence the agendas of their member state governments. Contrary to the CoR, the RegLeg 
were lobbying for a restructuring of the CoR to reflect the power of the large group of 
members with legislative powers. The drafters of the Constitution did not however agree to 
this restructure.  
                                                 
29 Chapter 4, TEC and Protocol 30. 
30 See Laeken Declaration adopted at the European Council at Laeken, December 2001.  
31 Emphasis added. 
32 Charlie Jeffery, “Regions and the Future of Europe”, EU Reform Spotlight (2002-03), Centre for Applied 
Research and Bertelsman, 2003, 2. 
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The CoR itself advocated in the Convention for three major changes to its role in the EU 
decision-making process. Firstly, it requested that its status be elevated to that of an EU 
institution on a par with the EP, the Council, the Commission, the ECJ and the Court of 
Auditors. This was of course a bold move given that the regions already had the possibility of 
being represented both by the EP and some in the Council. Secondly, the CoR called for 
greater consultation rights. This request had two components: one, the CoR wanted the 
governing bodies to consult widely with associations of regional and local governments; and 
two, the CoR wanted to be included in the consultation mechanism for the member states’ 
parliaments. This is the Early Warning System (EWS), whereby member state parliaments 
will have the right to comment on the Commission’s legislative proposals and are allowed to 
give reasoned opinions if they feel a proposal does not comply with the division of 
competence as laid out in the principle of subsidiarity. Thirdly, the CoR wanted the right to 
bring actions to the ECJ. This too was a bold step inasmuch as recourse to the ECJ is usually 
seen as the exception rather than the rule. While these three areas were basically the same as 
the CoR had sought incorporated in the Amsterdam Treaty without success, the pressure of 
the RegLeg may have helped the CoR to increase its own pressure on the drafters of the 
Constitution. But in the Working Group on the Principle of Subsidiarity to the Convention, 
there was wide agreement to give rights to the CoR but not to the Regleg.33  
 
This is not to say that the CoR has found a comfortable place in the system of multi-level 
governance of the EU. For instance, relations with the Council of Ministers are not always 
uncomplicated. The Council, at present, plays an important role in determining both the 
composition and functioning of the CoR. Despite the existence of a working procedure 
between the Secretariat General of the Council and the CoR to systematize the exchange of 
information, the Council does not issue reports on the follow-up that was given to the 
opinions. While this may be indicative of the level of importance that the member states 
afford the CoR, it also reveals that future relations between EU institutions may well become 
a battleground of identities. Of course, it shows that third level integration continues to be 
constrained by the strong powers at the member state level. As regions with or without 
legislative powers cannot address the EU institutions directly, they must still go through their 
national parliaments. Where sub-state units have autonomy and perhaps self-government 
rights, their political power is considerably stronger at the member state level than at the EU 
level. The depth of this problem will vary from member state to member state and the ease 
with which it can be remedied depends heavily on constitutional arrangements. However, the 
challenge for the new member states and the candidate states consists in guaranteeing their 
local and regional authorities a certain degree of voice in the European institutions designed to 
represent them so that the sub-state entities can play an active role in monitoring the principle 
of subsidiarity. This challenge relates to issues of power-sharing, districting and public 
administration and, in many new member states, also to the impetus for national minority 
political mobilization supported by both internal and external factors.   
 
2. EU Cohesion Policy and NMRs 
A major factor in national minority mobilization is arguably the EU’s Cohesion Policy (also 
known as the regional policy). It traces its roots back to 1975 when, partly as a result of the 
UK’s entry to the European Community, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
was established. The concept of economic cohesion was introduced in the SEA, and resulted 
                                                 
33 Report from the Chairman of Working Group I on the Principle of Subsidiarity, CONV 286/02 of 23 
September 2002, at 8.  
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in the adoption of policies supported by the so-called Structural Funds. Since the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992), these have constituted one of the priorities of EU policies. According to Article 
158 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, cohesion is a precondition for harmonious development 
in the EU in order to promote its overall harmonious development. This means that the EU 
shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and social 
cohesion and aiming at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions or islands, including rural areas.  
 
Under the 2000-2006 EU Cohesion Policy, 213 billion EUR (in 1999 prices), i.e., 
approximately one third of the entire EU budget, was set aside for distribution. This amount 
approximates 0.35% of the gross European product and averages 3.2% of the GDP of the 
regions receiving structural assistance. The budget for the Structural Funds alone amounts to 
EUR 195 billion in 2000-2006. There are four types of Structural Funds and each of them has 
its own specific focus.34 The Cohesion Fund was established in 1993 as an instrument to 
provide direct finance for individual projects, with the aim of improving the environment and 
developing transport networks to member states with a per capita GNP of less than 90% of the 
Community average (Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal). The Cohesion Fund supports 
projects at member state level and, as requested by the EP, aims to maintain a 50-50 balance 
between environment and transport projects. The Cohesion Fund for the period 2000-06 is 19 
billion EUR.  
 
At present, the Cohesion Policy has three priority objectives. Objective 1 – holding 
fundamental priority – is to assist areas whose economic and social development is lagging 
behind. Only areas with a per capita gross domestic product lower than 75% of the 
Community average are eligible for assistance under Objective 1. Nearly 70% of all Structural 
Funds have been put into the achievement of this objective. Activities within the framework 
of Objective 2 concentrate on supporting a thorough economic and social conversion of areas 
experiencing structural difficulties in industry, agriculture, etc., while Objective 3 stresses 
modernizing education, training and employment systems. 
 
Since the establishment of the Cohesion Policy, member states have had to negotiate at two 
levels: on the one hand, at the supra-state level and, on the other hand, at the regional and 
local levels. Particularly in the classic unitary states, the central level has more or less 
successfully tried to preserve its role of ‘gatekeepers’ by channelling contacts through central 
ministries and constraining the authorities of sub-state governments. The central governments 
play an important role at two levels: the programming and the management of the 
programme. Programming was an essential element of the 1988, 1993 and 1999 reforms of 
the Structural Funds. Programming involves the preparation of multi-annual development 
plans35 and is undertaken, in several stages, through a partnership-based decision-making 
process until the measures are taken over by the public or private bodies entrusted with 
carrying them out. Development and conversion plans are first submitted by the member 
states. Under the new Structural Fund rules, the member states must furthermore appoint a 
                                                 
34 The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); the European Social Fund (ESF); the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF); and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG). 
35A Development Plan is the analysis prepared by a Member State in light of the objectives referred to in Article 
1 and the priority needs for attaining those objectives, together with the strategy, action priorities, specific goals 
and the related indicative financial resources. A Community Support Framework (CSF) is a document approved 
by the Commission, in agreement with the Member State concerned, following appraisal of the Development 
Plan submitted by the Member State. It contains the action strategy and specific objectives. 
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managing authority (at state, regional or another level) for each programme. The tasks of this 
authority cover the implementation, correct management and effectiveness of the programme 
(collection of statistical and financial data, preparation and transmission to the Commission of 
annual reports, organization of the mid-term evaluation, etc.).  
 
According to the degree of decentralization within the member state, there are different forms 
whereby the regions may have access to the funds. In France, for example, the regions have 
been formally excluded from the process of attracting EU Structural Funds, and the 
prefectures, as representative of the Ministry of the Interior, have led the negotiations, 
defining the object of intervention, the zones of eligibility and the inter-regional distribution 
of the funds.36 Nevertheless, France has recently adopted a decentralization law, which 
introduces the possibility for regional councils and other territorial governments to 
experiment with the management of the 2000-2006 Programme. In the same way, the UK’s 
sub-state authorities have had little influence on the EU Cohesion Policy, whereas the German 
Länder had strong influence, leaving the federal government with little influence. Although 
the influence of sub-state authorities on European policy-making varies, the EU has, 
nonetheless, enhanced their position in recent years. In new member states, the Managing 
Authority for the programme is always the central government through the ministries related 
to the programmes. But in other cases, as in Germany, Italy or Spain, with a higher degree of 
decentralization, the local/regional governments are designated to play the role of managing 
authorities.  
 
Since 2000, EU’s Cohesion Policy has undergone a fundamental change due to the EU 
enlargement. The new member states have already benefited from the pre-accession funding. 
The Phare programme has been funding modernisation in the Central and Eastern European 
states for over ten years. In 1997 and 1999, it was modified to meet the requirements of 
accession and to prepare the accession states for the Structural Funds. It finances a raft of 
projects, including cross-border cooperation schemes, in areas that will be covered by the 
Structural Funds. The Pre-Accession Structural Instrument (ISPA) has been funding transport 
and environmental schemes in all the Central and European states since early 2000, along the 
same lines as the Cohesion Fund model designed for the least prosperous EU member states. 
It provides direct financing for environmental projects to help apply directives that call for 
heavy investment, and for transport projects directly connected to the ten pan-European 
corridors that have been identified in these countries. The Special Accession Programme for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) has also been in operation since 2000, 
helping the applicants prepare for the common agricultural policy, in particular for its 
standards of food quality and consumer and environmental protection. 
 
As the GNP of almost all the new member states is lower than 50% of the Community 
average, 48 EU regions qualified in 2000 for assistance under Objective 1 since their income 
was lower than 75% of the Community average. Whereas preliminary estimates show that the 
number of such regions in EU25 will grow to at least 67, several current beneficiaries will 
lose their right to assistance under Objective 1 because the average GNP will be lowered in 
EU25 if the current rules of the European regional policy are maintained. This problem is 
referred to as the ‘statistical effect’. The European Commission calculates that as many as 18 
regions that currently use EU assistance may find themselves in this predicament.  
 
                                                 
36 Udo Bullmann, The Politics of the Third Level, in Charles Jeffery (ed.), The Regional Dimension of the 
European Union: Towards a Third Level in Europe? (Frank Cass, London, 1997). 
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In July 2004, the Commission adopted a proposal of five new regulations for renewed 
Structural Funds and instruments. Over the period 2007-2013, these instruments present about 
one third of the EU budget or a total of EUR 336.1 billion. The majority of this amount will 
be spent in less-developed member states and regions. Almost every region of the new 
member states is eligible to receive the Structural Funds. Moreover, the new member states 
will receive 5.76 billion EUR for rural development during the 2004-06 period. As Poland is 
predominantly an agricultural country, it will receive nearly half of this aid. These funds will 
help farms in these states to modernize, restructure and comply with EU production standards.  
 
The management of Structural Funds for the new member states implies far-reaching changes 
in the practice and operations of all levels of administration to comply with the legal 
framework of regulations on which structural assistance is based. Considerable efforts have 
already been made in the areas of the establishment of an appropriate legal framework and the 
definition of an administrative breakdown of the territory according to the NUTS 
classification37. But arguably, the sheer size of the EU’s budget being allocated to these 
regions and the effects these funds will have on the future life of the populations living in 
these regions augurs for the Cohesion Policy area being a highly contested area of politics. 
Such a strong concentration of power is likely result in an impact upon those regions where 
national minorities have witnessed disregard and suppression by central governments for 
years. Although the Cohesion Policy is primarily seen as a socio-economic tool in the effort to 
secure territorial cohesion, it is important to keep in mind that the socio-economic sphere of 
the EU is indeed culturally diverse and culture is usually the driving force behind strong 
political movements.  
 
3. National Minority Party Coalitions 
One piece of evidence demonstrating national minority politics mobilization at the third level 
is the emergence of national minority transnational party coalitions. These party federations 
have successfully expanded due to the disaffection of electorates with existing traditional 
political parties. They are defined as referring to the efforts of geographically concentrated 
peripheral national minorities, which challenge the working order of member states.38 They 
have followed the model of socialist parties by developing transnational federations and 
political groups. Indeed, the European Parliament (EP) funds programmes to encourage 
cooperation between parties in Europe for elections and within the Parliament itself. The 
European Free Alliance (EFA) is an example of this type of cooperation (with members of the 
Scottish National Party, from Wales and Catalonia), allied with The Greens in the EP. Since 
its creation in 1981 (signed by six parties), membership in EFA has increased dramatically to 
include over 20 parties. Another strong and fairly recent coalition is the Regional Authorities 
with Legislative Powers (RegLeg). RegLeg is a group of 20 powerful EU regions, which 
                                                 
37 In order to facilitate the collection, compiling and dissemination of comparable regional statistics, the 
European Union is introducing a common classification of territorial units for statistical purposes (NUTS) in 
place of the one established by Eurostat. The NUTS classification divides up the economic territory of the 
Member States, including their territory outside regions as such. The latter comprises parts of the economic 
territory that cannot be assigned to a given region such as air space, territorial waters and the continental shelf, 
territorial enclaves (embassies, consulates and military bases), or resource deposits located in international 
waters and exploited by units residing in their territory.The NUTS classification is hierarchical in that it 
subdivides each Member State into three levels: NUTS levels 1, 2 and 3. The second and third levels are 
subdivisions of the first and second levels respectively. Member States may decide to go further still in terms of 
hierarchical levels by subdividing NUTS level 3. 
38 F. Müller-Rommel, “Ethnoregionalist parties in Western Europe: theoretical considerations and framework of 
analysis” in Lieven de Winter and Huri Türsan (eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe (Routledge, 
London, 1998), 19. 
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founded an informal cooperative venture to lobby the 2000 EU Intergovernmental Conference 
and to influence the Treaty of Nice. RegLeg regions have competence in three areas of 
government: legislative, executive, and judiciary. Indeed, a large percent of the EU population 
live in RegLeg regions. The aim of the RegLeg is to strive for an enhanced role for those 
regions in the EU. This means increased political and legal status in all domains of EU 
governance, according to their competencies and responsibilities. Finally, a third example of 
coalition is the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN). This association specifically 
represents national minority groups, whether territorially defined or not, and pursues the goal 
of preserving their national identity, their language, culture and the history of national 
minorities. It works towards a neighbourly, peaceful coexistence of majority and minority in 
one state or region. FUEN supports all state activities aimed at peaceful reconciliation of 
interests and democratic minority policy and attempts to convince European parliaments and 
governments that part of the peaceful development of Europe involves taking account of the 
interests that national minorities and ethnic groups are entitled to in preserving their original 
identity and helping them to preserve their traditional culture. 
 
4. Brussels Based Representation 
Representation offices established in Brussels by sub-state units are a mushrooming 
phenomenon, which emerged in the EU15 realm. As an answer to a perceived lack of 
information on the part of the European institutions on the one side and the national 
governments on the other side, regions lobbying within the EU have been seen to involve two 
complementary strategies. First, regions have used ‘intra-state’ strategies to lobby the EU 
through national institutions. Individually or collectively, regions seek to influence national 
government positions on EU policy that will be transmitted through the Council of Ministers 
and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) to the Commission. Secondly, 
‘extra-state’ strategies employed by regions to lobby the Commission directly through 
regional information offices in Brussels have resulted in the establishment of a number of 
regional offices in Brussels.39 The first such office was established in 1984 by Birmingham 
City Council. By 1988, 15 offices had opened, 54 by 1993 and 140 by 1995.40 Although its 
relevance to the mobilization of NMRs in the new architecture of the EU is unknown, the 
number of representation offices has reached almost 170, including both regional (151) and 
local or municipal authorities (17) representations.  
 
Furthermore, some states, such as Germany, Austria and Spain have regional representatives 
within the offices of the national Permanent Representations to the EU in Brussels. Their 
main task is to inform the governments of local and regional authorities and parliaments of all 
EU policy developments, which could affect their exclusive competencies or essential 
interests. This is aided by their receiving all EU documents from the Council Secretariat and 
other EU institutions. Equally important is the task of bringing regional interest or concerns 
about EU proposals to the attention of their colleagues in the Permanent Representations. 
 
In terms of structure, there are different models of regional information offices established in 
Brussels. This variety reflects, on the one hand, the degree of decentralization in the member 
state, and on the other hand, the purposes and the activities which the office wants to carry on 
within the European institutions. The most common model is to represent the regional/local 
authority jointly. Another common model is to have a consortium of local authorities (and 
                                                 
39 Peter Lynch, “Regions and the Convention on the future of Europe: a dialogue with the deaf?”, 11(2) 
European Urban and Regional Studies (2004), 170-177. 
40 Charles Jeffery, “Regional Information Office in Brussels and Multi-Level Governance in the EU: A UK-
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some times regional development agencies, higher education institutions etc.), which pool 
resources to set up a small office with a group of staff employed by that office (rather than 
representing individual members of the partnership). There are one or two variants, including 
having a development agency representative in a government office or having a university 
representative in a government office. Finally there is a third model, which foresees the 
establishment of a multilevel office for the representation and the coordination of both 
governmental and non-governmental, and public and private interests.  
 
The German Länder, most of the Italian Regions and some Spanish Regions Representation 
offices belong to the first model of a single regional/local authority office. This kind of office 
represents one single territorial entity and is often considered to be the direct extension of the 
region’s European strategy and operations. Whether it has to report to the President’s office, 
or the Department/Ministry of European Affairs, Finance or Justice of the region often 
depends on the level of importance and competence it is given, which in turn leads to 
different sets of working criteria, prestige and perhaps political influence. The German Länder 
established their Regional Information Offices between 1986 and 1992, with the main 
purpose of boosting their capacity for input into the European decision-making process and of 
accessing European information flows and policy debates. There are also other reasons for the 
establishment of Länder office in Brussels, such as access to the Structural Funds and various 
other EU funding sources. They also constitute an important two-directional communication 
channel to the Commission. The first direction consists in getting hold the information as 
early as possible on Commission initiatives and priorities, which may be of interest to the 
Länder executives. The second direction of information flow involves the regional offices in a 
more pro-active role, in which they seek to feed in the information to the Commission at the 
early stages of policy debate and formulation.  
 
Cross-border regional offices represent a variant of the first model. Here, the regional office is 
composed of sub-state entities from different member states, such as the joint Anglo-French 
office of the county of Essex and the region of Picardy; the Austrian-Italian EU Liaison 
Bureau of Tyrol, Alto Adige and Trentino; or the Euroregion Secretariat of Kent; Nord-Pas de 
Calais; and Wallonia. They are often based on former and, hence, close relationships between 
the entities, a shared tradition and interest as well as joint participation in European initiatives 
and programmes. Despite some initial institutional and legal difficulties or misunderstandings 
within their own federated system, these transnational regional offices are able to provide the 
know-how, contacts, linguistic ability and experience of internal structures and agendas of at 
least two member countries. Given these advantages, this model might be regarded as the 
future model for bases in the EU.41  
 
A good example of the second model of consortia of regional/local authorities is the regional 
representation office of Catalonia. The Patronat Català Pro Europa is a public consortium 
created in 1982 by Catalonia Generalitat and by a joint-group of Catalan entities representing 
the economic, financial, cultural, administrative and academic interests. It was first 
established in the region’s capital, Barcelona, in order to prepare and familiarize the Catalan 
population for Spain’s integration. In 1986, the institution opened a delegation office in 
Brussels, which supplies information and maintains contacts with the Commission and other 
Community institutions. Nearly 50% of these are requested by economic, social and 
professional sectors. The Patronat carries out its tasks mainly in Barcelona (even if the 
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institution has its offices also in the provinces of Tarragona, Girona and Lleida, which ensure 
a bottom-up approach), while the Brussels delegation has been established at the aim of 
fostering interregional cooperation and of maintaining close relations with the Permanent 
Representation and with the other European institutions. It takes care of organizing, 
promoting and coordinating activities linked to the Community and other European 
organizations. Chaired by the President of Catalonia, the Patronat assembles representatives 
of Catalan Universities, Save Banks, Chamber of Trade and Industry, Local Government 
associations and the town hall of Barcelona. The body's council is organized in three sections: 
the academic, the parliamentarian and the socio-economic, in which participate 
enterpreneurial organizations, professional associations and unions, including Catalan 
representatives of Community lobbies and officials in Brussels. The Brussels delegation is 
composed of 15 members, who deal with European affairs, commercial and cultural 
promotion. The main activities of the Patronat are the preparation of courses and seminars 
about the EC especially addressed to economic and professional sectors; the diffusion of the 
R&D Community programmes; and a consulting service called ‘Europa-93’ aimed to provide 
information about the impact of the internal market.  
 
An example of the third model is the Scotland House in Brussels, created in 1999. Scotland 
House brings together Scotland Europa, the umbrella organisation promoting Scotland's non-
governmental and commercial interests in Europe, the Scottish Executive EU Office, 
Convention of Scotland Local Authorities (CoSLA), the Highlands and Islands European 
Partnership and several other offices from both the public and private sectors. A total of 50 
full-time members of staff work in Scotland House for 20 organisations from both the public 
and private sectors. Although the various organisations work independently, collaboration 
occurs frequently where priorities overlap. The original feature of the Scotland House model 
is that it reflects the plurality of Scottish civic, governmental and commercial society. It 
allows a very wide range of Scottish bodies to participate in having their own direct access to 
information, and scope for influence. Scotland Europa was established in 1992. At that time, 
in the absence of devolution, it was not considered appropriate by the Scottish Executive 
Office to seek a separate presence in Brussels. However, the Scottish Executive Office gave 
its blessing to the Scottish enterprise-led initiative to set up Scotland Europa. Following the 
change of Government in 1997 and the prospect of devolution, the Scottish Executive Office 
set up a two-person team in Brussels. 
 
However, the list of regional office models is not exhaustive, in the sense that more forms of 
representations could be identified and defined. For example, it is not unusual that regional 
offices cooperate in specific fields, establishing ad hoc partnership offices. This type of 
regional office can be described as partnerships of sub-state bodies in the sense that the bodies 
have come together of their own volition to work together on a range of issues that have a 
European dimension. They normally do not have any formal or institutionalized role in the 
governmental structures, e.g., NASC West Ireland EC Liaison and Regio Randstad (NL).42 
Only a few of the new member states have set up regional or local representation in Brussels 
so far. Poland has the highest number of regional representations (eleven regions out of 
sixteen have their regional representation office in Brussels). Slovakia has three regional 
offices in Brussels, while Estonia has only the representation of Tallinn City. Latvia and 
Cyprus do not have any regional representation offices as yet. Romania’s national association 
of county councils is represented by a separate office although the link between regions and 
the decision-making process is at present handled by Romania’s Representation. Aiming at 
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enhancing the dialogue and cooperation between regional and local authorities in the EU and 
Romania, a Joint Consultative Committee between representatives of local authorities from 
Romania and the CoR is envisaged. Certainly, it is not only the regions of the established 
EU15 member states that have shown ability to organize themselves for lobbying but also the 
new and aspiring member states are preparing for this activity. For the new member states, the 
desire to access EU funding flows has been, and remains the driving force behind the 
establishment of a presence in Brussels. Even though NMRs in the candidate countries have 
not established direct regional representations in Brussels, it is likely to be a phenomenon of 
the near future. 
 
5. Para-diplomacy 
The phenomenon of para-diplomacy has emerged as a result of the stronger NMRs seeking 
expanded leverage through partnerships. One definition of para-diplomacy holds that para-
diplomacy is functionally specific, usually limited to matters of common economic or cultural 
interest – although in the case of NMRs it does extend to the promotion of the territory as 
something more than a mere region – and serves to legitimize nationalist aspirations.43 The 
concept of para-diplomacy thus refers to external relations of sub-state actors. Such relations 
can be either coordinated with, or complementary to, activities of the central state level or 
pursued in conflict or concurrence with traditional diplomacy. The term ‘para-diplomacy’ 
appeared in the literature in the 1960s, with the international involvement of American and 
Canadian federal states in the context of globalisation.44 As para-diplomacy concerns all 
levels of international action (military, cooperation, development, human rights) when 
regional governments become international actors, the trans-national relations of regions may 
constitute a challenge to the member state’s monopoly over international relations. The 
objective of para-diplomatic actors is thus to encourage transnational as opposed to 
international collaboration. Para-diplomacy means that although European states remain the 
principal actors of European integration, they are no longer in a position of monopoly. The 
bulk of para-diplomatic activity in Europe occurs between regional governments and NMRs 
holding self-government (interregional or trans-border/national relations). The Four Motors of 
Europe is an example of this type of para-diplomacy with cross-boarder and interregional 
cooperation (regions of Baden-Württemberg, Catalonia, Rhones-Alpes, Lombardia).  
 
Traditionally, European states acted according to the logic of a centralized state when 
determining which international policies to adopt. However, sub-state actors push for a 
greater role of regions in Europe both on their state government and on European institutions. 
NMRs seek to become international actors in order to obtain resources and support, which 
they often lack at the internal level. Globalisation and European integration have provided a 
new context for territorial politics and regional restructuring. Regions are no longer confined 
within their state borders but have become an element in European and international 
politics.45 The need for recognition and identity construction of certain regions (Catalonia, 
Quebec, Scotland, Flanders, Wallonia, the Basque Country) explains the priority of para-
diplomacy for nationalist sub-state movements. Thus, nationalism is a crucial force behind 
para-diplomacy. Indeed, the development of para-diplomacy is much stronger in NMRs 
where there are strong nationalist movements. While many central governments consider the 
intrusion of these movements into their exclusive domains of foreign policy as essentially 
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negative, this is arguably a paradigm that has emerged as a result of a more diverse world 
picture.  
 
III  THE MODEL NMRs: BELGIUM 
 
The prominent examples in Europe of NMRs are the two Belgian national minorities. The 
Belgian state has been ethnically mixed for centuries, with a Flemish community in the north 
and a French-speaking Walloons community in the south. The national question in Belgium 
was initially defined as a language issue, although later it assumed socio-economical aspects 
as well. At present, the population of Belgium amounts to 10,309,700 people.46 The 
Flemings, with 5,765,800 people, constitute 57.8% of the total population, the Walloons 
constitute 32.6% and the German speakers 0.7%. The peculiarity of Belgian federalism is that 
it not only uses ‘regional territory’ as the basis of its federal structure but also comprises a 
non-territorial component. Thus, there are officially three territorially defined entities, called 
Regions: the Flemish Region (Flanders), the Walloon Region (Wallonia) and the Brussels 
Capital Region (Brussels). Furthermore, Belgium is divided into three cultural communities: 
the Flemish community (thus bringing together the Dutch-speakers who live in Flanders and 
in Brussels), the French community (assembling the French-speakers who live in Wallonia 
and in Brussels) and a tiny German-speaking community in the east of the country. Each of 
these Regions and communities has its own parliament and executive and is entrusted with 
constitutionally assigned powers. For this reason, Belgium is constituted in the form of a so-
called ‘multinational state’, that is to say that the Belgian concept of state is based on the idea 
of multilingualism and the coexistence of different ethnic groups enjoying equal rights. 
  
The present redistribution of power between federal and sub-national entities is the result of a 
long devolution reform (1970, 1980, 1988, 1993), under the pressure of the Walloon and 
Flemish nationalistic demands. Reform then came in three waves. In 1970, the existence of 
different territorial and cultural identities and the right to autonomy were constitutionally 
recognized. The second wave came in 1980, when the state was regionalized. The third wave 
of federalization began in 1989. The constitutional reform of 1989 stopped short of creating a 
federal state but in 1993, the reform formally characterized Belgium as a federal state. A 
mini-reform in 2001 further deepened federalization.  
 
Belgium’s unitary state structure resisted ethnic pressure until 1970, when the government 
declared before parliament that “the unitary state, its structure and functioning as laid down 
by law, had become obsolete”.47 The reform of 1980 opted more unambiguously for 
regionalization. The cultural communities gained new competences, the socio-economic 
regions were given institutional infrastructures and regional autonomy in general was 
strengthened. In addition to this, legislative acts of the regional and community councils were 
given the same legal status as national laws.  
 
The state reform of 1988-89 opted for a more systematic implementation of the dual 
federalism (‘two worlds’) model than that of 1980, but with a peculiar twitch. As usual under 
dual federalism, most competencies were exclusive and very few concurrent. This reduced 
opportunities for the federal level to interfere with the regions and communities and vice 
versa. But the second component of dual federalism, according to which the division of 
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powers runs along jurisdictional rather than functional lines, was still weak. With the 
constitutional reform of May 1993, Belgium finally became a federal state de jure. The 
revisions put in place the several institutions and mechanisms typical of a modern federation: 
direct election of regional councils; a senate representing constituent units’ interests; residual 
competencies vested within constituent units; fiscal federalism (changes in financing 
mechanisms and more fiscal autonomy); constitutional autonomy for each level over its 
working rules; international competencies and treaty power; and coordination and conflict 
resolution machinery. 48
e l g i u m a f t e r f o u r s t a t e r e f o r m 
One of the principle features of the new Belgian federal system is that there is no hierarchy 
between the federal level and the sub-national level. Thus, after the reform of 1993, the 
Belgian political system can be identified as a cooperative system, where the NMRs and the 
national government are mutually interdependent. The far-reaching character of the Belgian 
state reform is visible in the international competences of the Belgian NMRs. With the reform 
of 1993 the NMRs acquired the right to conclude international agreement in those policy 
fields in which they possessed exclusive competences, but respecting two limitations: acting 
within the confines of their competences and recognizing the general principles of Belgium’s 
foreign policy.  
 
Belgium’s territorial regions as well as the cultural-linguistic communities enjoy extensive 
involvement in EU institutions. The coordination of EU policy-making in Belgium is based 
on a highly institutionalized negotiating system and on an extensive set of informal 
agreements. This ensures that regions and communities are directly involved in both the 
formulation of Belgian responses to EU policy and in representation in the Council of 
Ministers. To this regard, in 1994 was concluded a Co-operation Agreement (CA) between 
the NMR governments and the federal state, which set up a system of concertation and co-
ordination among the different Belgian authorities. According to the CA, the Federal Foreign 
Ministry plays a central, albeit non preponderant, role in Belgian coordination on Council 
issues by way of its Directorate for the European Affairs.49 The Directorate organizes 
meetings where federal and NMR representatives take part (also the Permanent 
Representation of Belgium in EU is present), in order to determine the instructions for the 
Belgian representatives in the EU Council. A crucial element of the system is that the regions 
and communities can exercise a veto in the determination of Belgium’s policy in the Council. 
According to the Article 146 of the Maastricht Treaty, it is possible for Belgium to be 
represented in the Council by a member of one of its NMR governments. Regarding the 
different competences (exclusive federal, exclusive sub-national or shares competences), the 
Co-operation Agreement determines which governmental level is responsible for the issue in 
the Council.  This mechanism obliges both sides (federal and sub-national) to work together if 
they want to gain something within the EU Council, and to achieve their individual and their 
joint interests. 
 
IV  THE ‘NEW’ NMRs 
 
1. Narva, Estonia 
The municipality of Narva, where the Russian minority represents 85% of the population, is 
situated in the Ida-Virumaa county, along the border with the Russian Federation. In addition, 
Estonia claims 2000 sq km of territory currently in the Russian Federation, in the Narva and 
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Pechora Regions, based on the boundaries established in 1920. After 1991, the Russians 
living in Narva have insistently requested concession of some form of autonomy to avoid the 
discrimination policies that affect the Russian minority in the region. To that end, there 
appears to be a move towards support for enhanced territorial autonomy in northeast Estonia.  
 
The economic situation of Narva region is generally considered bleak by Estonian standards. 
Younger residents who go to study in Tallinn or Russia rarely return after graduation, whilst 
more and more are leaving to start new lives in the West. To reduce the disparities with the 
other regions, the Government of Estonia has recently adopted the Regional Development 
Programme of Ida-Virumaa. The Regional Development Programme defines new fields of 
economic activity that receive state support and, next to the economic sectors originating from 
the previous period of development, diversify the economic structure of the county. They also 
compensate for and anticipate the negative effect on employment and living standards of the 
fallen-out links in the county. The focus of the Programme is on the factors that facilitate and 
accelerate natural development and considerably change the social, economic, cultural and 
technical environment. The goal is a multicultural region with a diverse economic and social 
structure, its own distinct features and face; a region that is successful and known all over 
Europe. 
   
At the administrative level, Estonia is divided into 15 counties (maakond). Counties are 
divided into municipalities, which are of two kinds: rural municipalities (vald) and urban 
municipalities (linn). The Russian minority is concentrated in the area of Tallinn, the capital 
city of Estonia (in the Harjumaa region) and in the northeastern part of the country (in the Ida-
Virumaa county). With the exception of Ida-Virumaa county, where 71% of the population is 
Russian, all counties in Estonia possess an Estonian majority. In the other 14 counties, the 
Russian Minority composes, on average, 10% of the population. However, there are 194,000 
Russians living in Tallinn, where they make up about 36% of the population.50  
 
2. Daugavpils, Latvia 
The situation in Daugavpils, Latvia's second biggest town due to the industrial development 
that took place after World War II, is in some ways contradictory. The current ethnic 
composition of Daugavpils is: 58.8% Russian; 13.77% Latvian; 13.19% Polish; 8.6% 
Belarussian; 2.89% Ukrainian; and 0.86% Lithuanian.51 Since 1991, Latvia has adopted 
restrictive legislation with the intention of diminishing the status of Russians within Latvia, 
excluding them from the new polity by reserving citizenship for those with roots in Latvia 
prior to 1940 (when 77% of the citizen were Latvian and only 8% Russian) and by limiting 
the use of the Russian language in public activities. As a result, the main part of the Russian 
and Russian-speakers minority is now a mass stateless in Latvia. Despite a jump in the 
naturalization rate, also under the pressure of European Union, Latvia still has about 550,000 
stateless ‘non-citizens’, 547,515 who are ethnic non-Latvian (and 67% of them are Russians). 
The naturalisation rate in Daugavpils is considered unsatisfactory. Currently more than 30% 
of Daugavpils residents do not participate in political life, they have no political choice.  
 
A debilitating effect of lack of access to citizenship in Latvia is the restricted influence of the 
Russian-speaking minority over the composition of decision-making bodies.  Although the 
rhetoric of ethnic protectionism, common in the early independence elections of 1993, has 
given way in Latvia to the discourse of integration, minorities remain disproportionately 
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under-represented in decision-making bodies and state institutions. No laws guarantee 
political representation to minorities. By contrast, minority representatives seeking election in 
national as well as municipal elections are required by law to demonstrate the highest level of 
fluency in the Latvian language to be registered as candidates, in breach of Latvia’s 
international obligations. For example, following municipal elections in March 2001, the 
newly elected mayor of Daugavpils belongs to the Russian minority. After having been 
elected, he was required by the State Language Center to take a new language test in order to 
demonstrate Latvian language proficiency even though his language proficiency certificate 
was still valid. 
 
Nevertheless, the Russian community of Daugavpils has a well-developed organizational 
structure. The governing council has the most important functions: decision-making and the 
defence of Russian rights. For this reason, many Latvians complained that Russians are in a 
privileged position compared to them, that they are often obliged to speak Russian in the 
shops and in public activities, and that Latvian language education is threatened, especially in 
secondary schools.  
 
The challenge for Latvia as a member of the EU consists in overcoming the existent 
contradiction between a liberal democracy based on individual rights and the nation-state as 
an expression, guardian, and in a sense, property of one ethnic community. There are no 
special institutions dealing with minorities on the local level in Latvia. Meanwhile, local 
bodies concern minority issues in their activity. Thus, municipal councils decide on the 
establishment, structure and closure of secondary schools (including minority schools) on a 
given territory. A special committee on non-citizens (Aliens of Latvia, who are predominantly 
persons belonging to minorities) was established in Daugavpils but does not function now. In 
2000, another Russian municipality in Ventspils developed its own programme for integration 
minorities. But these samples are isolated, unsystematic cases.  
 
Latvian legislation recognizes the division of powers between the national and local 
governments. The administrative division of the country consists of 26 counties (rajons) and 7 
municipalities*: Aizkraukles Rajons, Aluksnes Rajons, Balvu Rajons, Bauskas Rajons, Cesu 
Rajons, Daugavpils*, Daugavpils Rajons, Dobeles Rajons, Gulbenes Rajons, Jekabpils 
Rajons, Jelgava*, Jelgavas Rajons, Jurmala*, Kraslavas Rajons, Kuldigas Rajons, Liepaja*, 
Liepajas Rajons, Limbazu Rajons, Ludzas Rajons, Madonas Rajons, Ogres Rajons, Preilu 
Rajons, Rezekne*, Rezeknes Rajons, Riga*, Rigas Rajons, Saldus Rajons, Talsu Rajons, 
Tukuma Rajons, Valkas Rajons, Valmieras Rajons, Ventspils*, and Ventspils Rajons. In the 
early 1990s, several laws concerning local governance were adopted, such as the Law on 
Urban Local Governments (1991) or the Law on Local Government in the Capital Riga 
(1992). In 1994, the government of Latvia approved the Law on Local Governments (with 
several amendments in 1995-2001), which replaced previous legislation on local governance. 
The law determines types of local governmental bodies, areas of their competence, rights and 
duties of local bodies, principles of cooperation with the Government, etc.  
 
3. Brittany, France 
In the years of the French Revolution, Brittany was in opposition to the forced reorganization 
of the Roman Catholic Church. In both the nineteenth and the twentieth century, Brittany had 
been conservative in maintaining old religious sentiments.  There is, even today, an ingrained 
separatist movement in the region, and over a quarter of Brittany’s population speak Breton, a 
language that is closely related to the Celtic Cornish and Welsh. The Universities of Brittany, 
in Brest and Rennes, are centres for Celtic studies. 
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Breton nationalism grew in the nineteenth century and was fuelled by the anticlericalism of 
the Third Republic. The Breton autonomists, long successfully repressed by the French 
government, nevertheless resisted German bids for collaboration in World War II. During the 
1970s, Breton nationalists once again protested the French repression of Breton culture. 
Groups such as the Breton Revolutionary Army and the Movement of National Liberation by 
Socialism committed sporadic acts of violence, such as the exploding of a bomb in the palace 
of Versailles in June 1978. 
 
Brittany comprises four departments (Côtes d'Armor, Finistère, Ille-et-Vilaine and Morbihan) 
and covers 27,208 sq km, or 5% of metropolitan France, making it the ninth largest French 
region. Located at the westernmost tip of the European continent and boasting a 3,000 km 
coastline, the region has a population of nearly 2.8 million, making it France's seventh most 
populated region.  
 
A Celtic language, Breton, is still spoken in some parts of Brittany – traditionally in the west. 
In the east, a langue d’oïl known as Gallo, which is still spoken, was the traditional language 
until the French language came to dominate in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Gallo now finds itself under pressure, not only from the dominant Francophone culture, but 
also from the Breton language revival, which is gaining ground in territory that was 
traditionally Gallo-speaking. The privately funded Diwan schools, where most classes are 
taught in Breton, play an important part in this revival. The issue of whether they should be 
funded by the State has long been and still remains controversial. 
 
There are about 800,000 school-going children in Brittany. Only 5,700 of them can benefit 
from bilingual schooling (Breton-French). This figure takes into account all types of 
schooling – Diwan, state and private schools. Despite this insignificant percentage, the impact 
of these schools is very important, particularly on the Bretons' perception of their language. 
The number of pupils in the bilingual schools has progressed every year by 15 to 20%. To 
cope with this situation, a real movement in favour of the Breton langue now exists in 
Brittany. It is supported by dynamic cultural associations and some local communities. 
 
The Breton Liberation Front (BLF) is an illegal organization to which only a small number of 
Bretons subscribe. It advocates absolute independence for the region and its members have 
carried out terrorist bombing with the object of calling attention to their cause. However, the 
vast majority of Bretons advocate French rule, with the majority of those calling for more 
local control of their political affairs. A common thread, between all groups, is dismay over 
the decline of the Breton culture and a desire to restore its importance. 
 
4. Upper Silesia, Poland52
The historical region of Upper Silesia (Oberschlesien in German, Górny Śląsk in Polish and 
Horní Slezsko in Czech) is composed from the two following Polish regions: Województwo 
Opolskie and Województwo Śląskie. In English, the Polish ‘województwo’ may be rendered as 
‘voivodeship’, but for the sake of clarity we translate this term as ‘region’. Thus, in English, 
the former region is the Opole Region, while the latter – the Silesian Region. The name of the 
second region (prior to 1999 known as the Katowice Region) is quite confusing. It alludes to 
the eastern slither of Upper Silesia, which was granted to Poland in 1922. Then, in Polish 
usage, this area was termed as “Śląsk” (Silesia), while German sources more appropriately 
                                                 
52 Thanks to Tomasz Kamusella for providing extensive information for this section. 
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referred to it as ‘Ostoberschlesien’ (Eastern Upper Silesia). The historical region of Silesia 
(Schlesien in German, Śląsk in Polish, and Slezsko in Czech) extends from Görlitz (Germany) 
in the west to Katowice (Poland) in the East, and from Zielona Góra (Poland) in the north to 
Opava (the Czech Republic) in the south. Since the 15th century the western half of Silesia 
extending from Görlitz to Wrocław (Poland) has been known ‘Lower Silesia’ 
(Niederschlesien in German, Dolny Śląsk in Polish and Dolní Slezsko in Czech), as opposed to 
Upper Silesia located east of Lower Silesia and extending from Nysa to Katowice. 
 
The Opole Region derives its name from its administrative capital – the city of Opole. The 
same was true in the case of the Katowice Region until 1999 when it was renamed as the 
Silesian Region. However, its administrative capital remains the city of Katowice. Another 
complication is that close to half of the territory of the Silesian Region is comprised from 
historically non-Upper Silesian areas. It is true of the northeastern section of this region that 
extends from Kłobuck to Jaworzno, and, in the southeast, of the Żywiec area bordering on 
Slovakia. Last but not least, in popular speech and in journalese, the Opole Region is known 
as Śląsk Opolski in Polish or Oppelner Schlesien in German (Opole Silesia), and as the 
Opolskie in Polish and the Oppelner Land in German (Opole Land). Despite the 1999 change 
in the name of the Katowice Region, the local population tends to refer to their region as the 
Województwo Katowickie (Katowice Region), while in popular speech and journalese the 
synonymous phrase the Katowickie (Katowice Land) crops up quite often. 
 
In 1922, the League of Nations split Germany’s Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland, 
while a small southern area had been granted to Czechoslovakia two years earlier. In 1945, all 
of Upper Silesia (less Prague’s fragment of this region) and most of Lower Silesia were 
incorporated into Poland along the majority of the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse 
line (deutsche Ostgebiete). Five years later, the administrative division of Upper Silesia into 
the Opole and Katowice Regions was introduced. Unlike in the rest of the deutsche 
Ostgebiete (with the exception of the Olsztyn Region), in Upper Silesia the population – 
which was deemed of Polish and Slavic ethnic origin, or Polonizeable – was retained under 
the ambiguous name of the ‘Autochthons’ (autochtoni). However, in Communist Poland, 
most of the ‘Autochthons’ were not allowed to progress beyond the status of second-class 
citizens. This prompted their mass emigration – mainly to West Germany – whenever the 
Polish Communist regime slackened. In Upper Silesia during the period 1950-1989, this 
immigration involved 558,000 people, known as Aussiedler (ethnic German resettlers) in 
West Germany.53 In 1990-91, 165,000 more followed in their footsteps but in the mid-1990s 
this emigration wave subsided.54
 
In 1990-91, 300,000 to 400,000 ‘Autochthons’ declared themselves as Germans. In the 
Polish-Germany Treaty on Cooperation and Good Neighbourliness (1991), Warsaw 
recognized the existence of the German minority in Poland. The vast majority of this 
minority’s members reside in Upper Silesia. Numerous German minority organizations came 
into being. The most significant one is the TSKN (Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne 
Niemców in Polish, Sozial-Kulturelle Gesellschaft der Deutschen in German, that is, Social-
Cultural Association of Germans), based in the Opole Region with branches in the Silesian 
                                                 
53 Tomasz Kamusella, “Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia 1950-89 and the Ennationalizing Policies of Poland and 
Germany”, 2 Patterns of Prejudice (1999), 70. 
54 Tomasz Kamusella, “Ethnic Cleansing in Upper Silesia, 1944-1951”, in Steven Béla Vardy and T. Hunt 
Tooley (eds.), Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe  (Boulder, Social Science Monographs, distributed 
by Columbia University Press, New York, 2003) 307. 
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Region.55 In 1990, this German minority was represented by seven deputies in the Polish 
Parliament though recently the number sank to two. Since 1992, at least 250,000 members of 
Upper Silesia’s German minority have acquired German citizenship without the necessity of 
leaving for Germany. The German/EU passport has allowed them to seek legal employment 
in Germany and all over the EU, while this possibility remained closed to their Polish 
neighbours until Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004. The accession still did not level out 
this difference because the Polish passport allows one to seek employment only in three 
member states out of the pre-2004 EU’s 15, namely in Ireland, Sweden and the UK. The 
question of employment is of vital social importance due to the closure of almost all heavy 
industry (coal mines, metallurgical and chemical works) where most of Upper Silesia’s 
inhabitants worked until the mid-1990s.56
 
In 1993, the Kriegsfolgeneberinigungsgesetz (Act on the Consolidation of the Consequences 
of the War, passed by the Bundestag in 1992) came into force. Since that time, with the legal 
support of this act, Berlin’s policy has aimed at stemming the inflow of Spätaussiedler (late 
ethnic German resettlers) from Central Europe and at limiting the possibility of obtaining 
German citizenship by ethnic Germans residing outside Germany. These measures led to the 
rise of alienation among the traditional Upper Silesian (‘autochthonous’) population, 
especially in the Katowice/Silesian Region. They felt equally “left out hanging in the cold” by 
Berlin and Warsaw. The grudge against the Polish government is that after the speedy 
deindustrialization of Upper Silesia in the 1990s, its inhabitants were not provided with 
equally satisfactory employment alternatives. In the Opole Region, a similar feeling of 
alienation was shared by the middle-aged and young ethnic Germans who could not progress 
in the structures of the German minority organizations where leadership was reserved for the 
oldest generation who had attended at least two or three years of German elementary school 
before 1945. Ethnic Germans educated after World War II overwhelmingly do not speak 
German, as the use of this language was prohibited in Upper Silesia prior to 1989. 
 
Both of these alienated groups constitute the demographic basis of the Silesian national 
movement. In 1997, an initiative group of the Union of the Population of Silesian Nationality 
(ZLNŚ, Związek Ludności Narodowości Śląskiej) came into being. It emerged from the 
structures of the Movement for Silesian Autonomy (RAŚ, Ruch Autonomii Śląska), 
established in 1990. RAŚ has sought to make the Katowice Region into an autonomous region 
and to unite the Opole and Katowice Regions into the Region of Upper Silesia that would 
enjoy autonomy too. RAŚ lost its representation in the Polish Parliament in 1993 when the 
new Election Act introduced the 5% threshold for parties allowed into this Parliament. 
Organizations of national minorities were exempted from this requirement, so if the ZLNŚ 
were registered, this would allow for representing the ethnoregional issues from RAŚ’s 
programme in the Polish Parliament. But registration was denied to the ZLNŚ in 1997 and in 
consecutive years. The case was even brought to the European Court of Human Rights in 
2001 and 2004. Eventually, the Silesian leaders worked out alternative organizational 
structures within RAŚ. In 2002, the first census was conducted in post-Communist Poland. 
Also for the first time since 1946, questions about one’s nationality and family language were 
asked. As a result, Silesians numbering 173,000 constitute Poland’s largest national minority, 
immediately followed by the German minority with 153,000 members.  
 
                                                 
55 Bogumiła Berdychowska et al., Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce. Informator (1994). (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 
Warsaw, 1995); Tomasz Kamusella, “Asserting Minority Rights in Poland”, 3 Transition (9 February, 1996), 15. 
56 Tomasz Kamusella, “Dual Citizenship in Opole Silesia in the Context of European Integration”, 2(10) Facta 
Universitatis (2003), 699-716. 
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The overwhelming number of the members of both these minorities reside in Upper Silesia. 
Silesians concentrate in the Silesian Region and stem from two groups. The first embraces 
people who, in the 1990s, declared themselves as Germans but could not secure German 
passports for themselves. The other groups comprises ‘Autochthons’ who during the years 
1945-89, agreed that they were Poles. Now alienated by Warsaw’s economic policy and 
having no chance to obtain German passports either, they declared themselves as Silesians in 
the 2002 census. In the Opole Region, those who consider themselves to be Silesians come 
from the middle-aged and young members of the German minority, alienated by the fact that 
no career paths are available for them to progress in the TSKN structures. On top of that, the 
officially registered number of Silesians seems to be too low due to all kinds of irregularities 
and pressure exerted by census takers to prevent declaration of Silesian nationality during the 
2002 census. There were also cases of census takers who arbitrarily changed returns with 
‘Silesian nationality’ to ‘Polish nationality’. Hence, the adjusted number of Silesians is about 
200,000. 
 
The main problem faced by the German minority is its shrinking and aging demographic base, 
and the outflow of active middle-aged and young members to the ranks of the Silesian 
national movement. Another difficulty is that German as a national language has not been 
revived in Upper Silesia and those who speak it on everyday basis are usually aged over 70 
and do not number more than 3,000. On the other hand, Warsaw denies recognition to the 
Silesians as a national or ethnic minority, choosing to term them as a ‘social group’ in stark 
violation of the popular will expressed by Silesians in the 2002 census. In practice, this 
condemns them to prolonged social, economic, political and cultural marginalization, which 
the German minority in Upper Silesia suffered prior to 1989. 
 
Around 400,000 to half a million inhabitants of Upper Silesia, belonging to the German and 
Silesian national minorities, makes this region the most multicultural and ethnically 
variegated in contemporary Poland, which is unusually ethnically homogenous as compared 
to other Central European states. According to various estimates, national and ethnic 
minorities account for 2 to 5% of Poland’s population of 39 million. Germans and Silesians 
make up a quarter to one-third of the Opole Region’s populace of 1.1 million. But 150,000 to 
250,000 Silesians and Germans form an insignificant percentage among the 4.9 million 
inhabitants of the Silesian Region. 
 
5. Transylvania, Romania 
The Hungarians in Romania (1,447,544 persons) constitute 6.7% of the total population, 
representing the largest minority group in Romania.57 The majority of the Hungarians (99%) 
live in Transylvania, the western part of Romania, with an area of approximately 103,000 sq 
km, together with 12 other ethnic groups. None of these ethnic groups reaches 1% of the 
population except for the Roma (2.62%) and the Germans (1.41%). In Transylvania, 
Hungarians make up 20% of the population. They constitute a closed compact bloc, mainly in 
the Szekler Region. In two counties of this region, Co-vasna and Harghita, the Hungarian 
population represents the majority, more than three quarters of the population. Close to 28% 
of Transylvania’s Hungarians live along the 400 km-long Romanian–Hungarian border (in 
Szatmár/Satu Mare/, Bihar /Bihor/, Arad /Arad/ and Temes /Timiº/ counties, 16% to 18% live 
in Central Transylvania, and the remaining 18% to 20% in a multi-ethnic diaspora. At the 
level of municipalities, far more than half of the Hungarians live in settlements where their 
                                                 
57 Romanian Statistical Institute, 2002 Census. 
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share is 50% or more. This aspect is especially important for analyzing issues of local 
administration and local decision-making.  
 
As a result of the Romanian Government division of the country in eight so-called Regional 
Development Regions (mainly geographical regions: North East, South East, South, South 
West, West, North West, Centre and Bucharest Ilfov), the Transylvania historical region has 
been divided between the West, the North West and the Centre Development Regions. 
 
Politically, the Hungarians have been actively involved in central politics since the beginning 
of the transition period. Between 1996 and 2000, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania (DAHR) took part in the central administration as a member of the government 
coalition. Thus, for the first time since its 80-year existence as a minority, the Hungarian 
national community in Romania came through the organization representing its interests in a 
position to accept governmental responsibility. The participation of DAHR in the Romanian 
government coalition provided a new opportunity, which it had never been given before. 
 
Local administration is comprised of a two-tiered system: the local level and the county level. 
There are 42 counties in Romania. Prior to 1996, the law on public administration seriously 
limited the effective exercise of local autonomy. Since 1996, the process of revising local 
administration and the relevant system of public finance has been underway, but the results 
have been highly ambiguous. A new law on local public finance was adopted, with the 
introduction of full autonomy in the management of local public funds. 
 
Another important dimension of public administration reform relates to minorities in public 
administration – a sensitive issue in Romania due to the ethnically selective personnel 
recruitment policies carried out during the Communist period. The Communist regime tended 
to distribute administrative positions unequally to Romanians, even in regions where 
Hungarians represented a majority of the population. In 1992, Hungarians comprised 3.73% 
of the people working in the areas of public administration and social security – a figure well 
below their percentage of the total Romanian population. Thanks to the engagement of the 
DAHR, which is not only a political party but also an organization functioning on a national 
and democratic basis and actively protecting minority rights, the situation of the 
representation at the local level has improved in the last years. As a result of the June 2000 
municipal elections, DAHR won 148 (5.01%) of the mayoral offices, and 2,451 local DAHR 
councillors (6.17%) and 315 county councillors (7.86%) were elected. At the same time, the 
party has four county council chairmen (Hargita/Harghita); Kovászna/Covasna; 
Maros/Mureº/; and Szatmár/Satu Mare), and nine council vice chairmen (Beszterce–
Naszód/Bistriþa–Nãsãud/; Bihar/Bihor; Brassó/Braºov; Hargita/2; Kolozs/Cluj;  Kovászna/2/; 
and Szilágy/Sãlaj/). Following the 2000 parliamentary elections, DAHR obtained 27 mandates in 
the 354-seat House of Representatives (Lower House) in Bucharest with 786,863 votes (7.83%), 
and 12 mandates in the 140-seat Senate (Upper House) with 751,310 votes (8.57%). 
 
The Romanian Constitution declares the country unitary and indivisible, which excludes any 
form of federal constructions. Minority language use in local administration was provisioned 
by the 1997 Emergency Act No. 22/1997, which guaranteed the use of minority language in 
those territorial-administrative units in which at least 20% of the population belonged to a 
minority community. 
 
6. Southern Slovakia 
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According to the data of 2001 census, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia represents 9.7% 
(520,528) of the total population (5,379,455).58 Some 77.7% of the Slovak Hungarians live in 
502 municipalities where Hungarians make up more than 50% of the population, and 90% of 
Hungarians live in 502 municipalities where they comprise at least 20% of the population. 
The geographic distribution of members of national minorities is politically as important as 
their total numbers. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia is fairly compactly located in three 
areas in southern Slovakia proximate to Hungary, which is crucial to some of the Slovaks’ 
fears relating to Hungarian demands for autonomy. In a country with a relatively low level of 
urbanization, the Hungarians are especially concentrated in rural areas. This inevitably means 
that Hungarians live in communities with an above-average unemployment rate and a below-
average income. 
 
Although Article 34 of the Slovak Constitution provides a certain degree of protection of 
ethnic minorities’ rights,59 the reform of State administrative boundaries concluded by the 
third Mečiar Government in 1996 altered drastically the territorial map of Slovakia, and the 
new administrative under-represents Hungarians in regional governments. This reform 
divided the country into eight regions (Kraje): Pozsony/Bratislava; Nagyszombat/Trnava; 
Trencsén/Trenèín; Nyitra/Nitra; Zsolna/Žilina; Besztercebánya/Banská Bystrica; Eperjes/ 
Prešov and Kassa/Košice, plus 79 districts. The regional division was done in a way that 
prevented the concentration of the Hungarian minority within single regions and districts. 
Hungarian counterproposals were likewise based on national criteria and tended to arrange 
administrative boundaries to maximize the areas where they would form a majority. On the 
contrary, the eight new regions were created horizontally on the map of Slovakia so that there 
is no region with a Hungarian majority anymore and in only two districts do the Hungarians 
make up more than half of the population. 60
 
In June 2001, the Slovak Parliament also established self-government districts, which, despite 
the protests of the Hungarian Coalition Party, are identical with the state administrative 
districts. The new Dzurinda government formed in October 2002 – despite the fact that all 
three parties now making up the Slovak government coalition had promised to do so – did not 
include in its programme a re-evaluation of the country’s territorial arrangement as proposed 
by the Hungarian Coalition Party. The district offices have been discontinued as of 1 January 
2004 and their tasks are being taken over by area, special, and in part village offices.  
 
The inequalities in the economic situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia are 
expressed in the following areas: income, land and other property, access to higher education, 
                                                 
58 According to the UN Human Rights Committee of 1996, the Hungarians represent 10.6% (568,714 persons) of 
the population in Slovakia. There is reason to believe that this number also includes about 150,000 Hungarian-
speaking Roma who prefer to be identified as Hungarians.  
59 Article 34(1). In the Slovak Republic, development in every field is guaranteed for citizens constituting a 
national minority or ethnic group, particularly the right to develop, together with other members of their minority 
or group, their own culture. They further have the right to disseminate and receive information in their own 
native language, to group themselves in nationality communities, to found and maintain educational and cultural 
institutions. The details are defined by law.  
(2) In addition to the right to gain proficiency in the state language, citizens belonging to national minorities or 
ethnic groups are ensured the right:  
a) to be educated in their native language; 
b) to use their native language in official contacts; and 
c) to participate in the resolution of issues relating to national minorities and ethnic groups. 
60 K. Henderson, “Minorities and politics in the Slovak Republic”, in Minorities in Europe – Croatia, Estonia 
and Slovakia, Snežana Trifunovska (ed.), Centre for Migration Law, University of Nijmegen, T.M.C., Asser 
Instituut, The Hague, Netherlands, 1999. 
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presence in commercial activities, presence in professions and presence in official positions. 
The Hungarian habitat is rural in character and lacks large cities. Accordingly, unemployment 
in this region (southern part of Slovakia) is relatively high. By the end of 1995, the 
unemployment rate in Slovakia’s district where Hungarians are in the majority was 8.1% 
higher than the average for the Slovak Republic. The Hungarian minority has been hit 
particularly hard by the collapse of the agricultural sector. Also the average income of 
members of the Hungarian minority is less than that of members of the Slovak majority; this 
is due partly to the lower level of educational attainment among the Hungarians. According to 
the data of the Statistical Office, the average national monthly income in 2003 in Slovakia 
was SK 14,365, while in the regions populated by the Hungarian minority, the average is only 
around SK 12,600. 
 
7. Northern Cyprus 
With the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU on 1 May 2004, the entire island of 
Cyprus effectively became EU territory, even though the island remains divided between the 
Greek-Cypriot Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot enclave in Northern Cyprus 
known as the Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, TRNC). 
Northern Cyprus is only recognized by Turkey.  
 
According to the estimate of 1998, Northern Cyprus has a population of 200,000.61 The 
division of the island in 1974 caused some 11,000 Turkish-Cypriots from the South to take 
refuge in the North; only 130 remain in the South. Immigration from the Turkish mainland 
has been encouraged and there are now about 40,000 Turkish farmers settled in Northern 
Cyprus.  
 
Living standards in Northern Cyprus have plummeted, partly as a result of the lack of 
international recognition and partly because of the Greek-Cypriot trade sanctions. The 
economy is now heavily dependent on aid from Turkey and many Turkish-Cypriots have 
emigrated, especially to the UK.62 According to the survey of the European Commission, in 
areas where the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control, 
per capita income stands at around EUR 4,400.63 The monetary union and high trade 
dependence of Northern Cyprus with Turkey effectively make the economy an extension of 
the economic situation there. However, modest growth was reported in 2002. Inflation, 
directly imported from Turkey, has been decreasing but is still unsustainably high – 24.5% in 
2002. The fiscal deficit reached about 17% of the GDP, entirely financed by transfers from 
Turkey, whereas the current account deficit fell below 1% of GDP.  
 
Behind seemingly high employment numbers, there is a large amount of hidden 
unemployment in the economy where the public sector is the largest employer. Public 
ownership or control is widespread and price control is pervasive. Reform programmes have 
been put into effect during the last two years but there is still a long way ahead and a great 
need for technical and financial assistance to construct and implement structural 
transformation. For this reason, the General Affairs Council of the EU is determined to put an 
end to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community and to facilitate the reunification of 
Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriot community.  
                                                 
61 Source: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus authorities. 
62 Minority Rights Group International (ed.), World Directory of Minorities, London 1997. 
63 Note that the data on the areas where the government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective 
control could not be independently verified. 
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Following the accession of Cyprus, the EU has pledged to reduce the regional disparities 
between the two communities. To this end, a package of financial aid and trade measures for 
the amount of EUR 259 million has been prepared for the period 2004-2006. The aim of the 
package is to prepare Northern Cyprus for full EU membership and, thus, the activities are 
similar to pre-accession activities. Due to the isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community 
over the last years, the package will have a strong focus on helping with acquis 
approximation, especially with regard to complying with European norms, inter alia, in the 
environmental and transport areas. Moreover, it will put emphasis on alignment with EU 
legislation and policies, reconciliation and confidence building measures, social and economic 
development, development of infrastructure and people to people contacts.  
 
Furthermore, the European Commission has proposed to facilitate direct trade from Northern 
Cyprus. This would include a preferential regime for products originating in Northern Cyprus 
entering the Customs Territory of the EU. This is envisaged as a tariff quota system, which 
would encourage economic development while avoiding the creation of artificial trade 
patterns or facilitating fraud. Finally, it has been decided to define special rules with regard to 
intra-island trade, including authorizing the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce to issue 
the necessary documents accompanying the goods, which will cross the Green Line between 
the North and the South.  
 
Recently, the European Commission announced its plan to open a representation in Northern 
Cyprus to monitor the flow and implementation of the EU funds. While setting up an office in 
the North does not mean the diplomatic recognition of the TRNC, it does, however, indicate 
that the EU is willing to cooperate with the leadership of Northern Cyprus to normalize the 
relationship with the EU. 
 
8. South East Anatolia, Turkey 
According to the census of 2000, the total population of Turkey amounts to 67,44,000, 
(according to estimates of July 2004, the number has risen to 68,893,918). The Turkish 
population includes different minorities: Kurds, Alevis (religious minority), Zaza language 
group, Balkan origin immigrants, Circassian and other Caucasus groups. Other Kurdish 
communities live in the territories of Syria, Iraq, Iran and in the Caucasian countries of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia at the border with Turkey. 
 
With 6,198,000 people, the Kurds are the largest national minority in Turkey, representing 
9.8% of the total population. There is not, however, agreement as to the exact number of 
Kurds who live on the territory of Turkey. At present, their numbers are estimated at around 
13,000,000, amounting to 20% of the population, although other sources estimate their 
number at 6 to 12 million.64 The Kurds are concentrated in the South Eastern Anatolian 
region of Turkey but, at present, they are displaced in other regions of Turkey, particularly 
after the upheaval in the 1990s, which led to the evacuation of a large proportion of the 
population. Thus, at least 6 millions Kurds live in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other industrial 
centres outside Kurdistan. 
 
At the administrative level, the territory of Turkey is divided into seven regions: Marmara, 
Aegean, Mediterranean, Black Sea, Central Anatolia, East Anatolia and South Eastern 
                                                 
64 Turkey Study 1995. Nevertheless, the large discrepancies between the figures cited for the size of the Kurdish 
population is also probably connected with the fact that there are different definitions of who is Kurd, depending 
on the criteria adopted (language, dialect, ethnic consciousness etc.). 
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Anatolia. Historically, the Turkish state has been overly centralized, primarily as a defence 
against centrifugal forces within the country. Ankara is at the centre of all administrative 
decisions; it appoints all the regional administrators, except for mayors and municipal council 
members. In early 1995, Turkey was divided into 76 provinces or vilayetlar. Each province 
was further subdivided into an average of about eight districts or kazalar. Provinces have very 
limited means of raising revenues on their own and are thus dependent on the central 
government for almost all disbursements. In the absence of any attempt at devolution of 
powers to the provinces, a move is taking place to increase the number of provinces by 
dividing the existing ones. According to this trend, in the last decade the number of provinces 
has increased to 80.   
 
Considering, on the one hand, the particular situation of South East Anatolia, the level of 
violence, the depth of grievances and the economic differentiation and, on the other hand, the 
Kemalist-Turkish political culture, a federalist solution for the Kurdish question is not yet 
envisaged. Nevertheless, the integration process within the EU could lead the Turkish 
government to accept the regionalization process and to introduce devolution policies into the 
political agenda.  
   
Politically, the Kurds are constituted in exile. The Kurdish Parliament in Exile was 
established in 1995 and held its first session in the Netherlands. It has played a significant part 
in placing the Kurdish question on the European political agendas. It acts as a Kurdish 
diplomatic representation and has established contact with numerous parties and personalities 
in Europe. Some of its core members represented the pro-Kurdish party HEP in Turkey’s 
parliament and asked for asylum in Europe when their immunities were lifted and they were 
threatened with imprisonment for ‘separatism’. Other members represented various Kurdish 
associations and constituencies, most of them close to the PKK. The Parliament is 
transnational in more than one respect. Most obviously, it is itself part of the Kurdish diaspora 
in Europe. It is ‘trans-state’ in that, although established by Kurds from Turkey, it includes at 
least one member from Iraqi Kurdistan and attempts to strengthen the representation of the 
other parts. Finally, it is transnational in that its members have political asylum in different 
European states and that, although it has permanent offices in Brussels, it has held its plenary 
sessions each time in a different European state, including the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, 
Russia and Italy. In Russia and Italy, it was able to convene in the national parliament 
buildings and was addressed by members of various political parties in the host country.65
 
Thus, the Kurdish diaspora is no longer marginal to what happens in South Eastern Anatolia 
but plays an increasingly central role. The history of the Kurdish diaspora illustrates the 
process of resurgence of Kurdish identity after a period of gradual incorporation into the 
Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian would-be ‘nation-states’. Significant Kurdish networks emerged in 
the mid-1970s. Not only has the Kurdish diaspora in the past two decades become 
increasingly oriented towards the situation and the struggle in Turkey, it has also come to 
make increasingly effective contributions to developments there. The role of the diaspora has 
been significant in the strengthening of a Kurdish culture, in organizing relief efforts and in 
supporting the military as well the political struggles in Turkey. The revival of Kurdish 
writing, at a time when the Kurdish language was banned in Turkey, could only have taken 
place in exile. Without the repression that forced Kurdish intellectuals out of Turkey, 
Kurmanci literature would probably not have experienced its present renaissance. Meanwhile, 
Turkey has, under European pressure, relaxed its laws and Kurdish books and journals can be 
                                                 
65 Martin van Bruinessen, “Transnational aspects of the Kurdish question”, available at http://www.let.uu.nl/ 
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published there, though within narrow limits. Thus, books that were first published in Europe 
could be reprinted in Turkey and debates from the diaspora were carried back to Turkey. 
Satellite television (MED-TV and its successors) has been an even more effective medium for 
bringing uncensored (or at least not state-censored) news and opinions to the Kurdish public 
in Turkey and neighbour countries. This, again, would have been unthinkable without the 
Kurdish diaspora. From the mastery of foreign languages and international legal expertise to 
know-how about European institutions and technical facility with the new media, the diaspora 
has significantly enriched the Kurds’ repertory of skills for representing their common 
interests. 
 
The politicization of the Kurdish diaspora as well as increasing efforts by the Turkish authorities 
to maintain or regain their control of their Turkish and Kurdish subjects abroad have gradually 
made clear that the Kurdish question is not just a Turkish problem but that it has also become a 
problem of European politics. The presence of increasingly effective Kurdish legal and political 
representation in Europe, the Kurds’ use of European civil liberties and Turkey’s efforts to limit 
these (for instance, by demanding a ban of MED-TV and attempting to outlaw the Kurdish 
Parliament in Exile), force European politicians to take a stand on the Kurdish issue. And a 
political stand on the Kurdish issue is ultimately also a stand on regionalism and minority rights 
in Europe itself, as many regionalists are very much aware. 
 
The 1982 Constitution, adopting the ‘unitary state’ model and the principle of a ‘single 
nation’ within the cultural mosaic, does not recognize the Kurds as an ethnic minority. They 
suffer many restrictions culturally, socially and politically. In fact, Kurds are technically 
allowed to publish in Kurdish but face police harassment and death squads if they do so. At 
the moment, the only legal Kurdish political party is HADEP, the socialist-oriented People’s 
Democracy Party. All the others are considered illegal. 
 
The August 2004 legislation lifted restrictions on minority language courses and broadcasting, 
including those in Kurdish. The change seemed to represent a new respect for linguistic 
diversity but the reforms were hedged with qualifications that could block effective 
implementation. Kurdish still could not be taught in universities or be broadcast by 
independent radio or television stations. Furthermore, no Kurdish language courses were 
apparently approved by the authorities and thousands of individuals were arrested for signing 
petitions asking for the right to be educated in Kurdish. Most Kurds in Turkey speak Kirmanji 
but many Alevis and some Sunnis speak Zaza.  
 
 
V  CONCLUSIONS 
 
NMRs, whether kin-state related or independent, represent strong social forces in addition to 
representing antagonistic cultural forces. To avoid having to address a ‘culture deficit’ in 
terms of neglected sub-state identities, the EU may have to pay attention to NMRs seeking 
inclusion in the third level integration process.  Indeed, European spaces have been created in 
which NMRs and aspiring regions interface with each other and with the institutions of the 
internal market economy. Networks, para-diplomacy and representation offices are the 
currency of these new spaces. As social resources and capital draw on the history and territory 
of NMRs to mobilize for political power-sharing in the system of European governance, 
institutional arrangements, social fabric, networks and discourses as well as strategies, social 
construction, self-identification and collective identification become part of the making of 
NMRs. Seeing the making of NMRs as an isolated intra-state phenomenon is thus no longer 
 40
feasible and the aspects of Europeanization and internationalization are perhaps the strongest 
factors in the changing fabric of not only member states but also the European mosaic of 
diverse identities. Where European states have traditionally acted according to the logic of the 
centralized state, they may now be faced with sub-state actors pushing for a greater role for 
NMRs in Europe, both on their state government and on European institutions. If these 
national minorities show particularly strong abilities to mobilize politically, drawing on long-
term histories and self-identification as sub-state identities, it would seem that whether 
empowered or disempowered, they may become a force for EU policy makers to contend with 
in the new EU25 and beyond.  
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